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INTRODUCTION: THE ALLURING ILLUSION OF TEXT
What do the words in an insurance policy mean? What is the legal
effect of those words? These two simple inquiries drive insurance and
contract law as well as the modern economy. Insurance is the financial
backstop of society’s losses—from automobile accidents to house fires to
injuries from defective products. Answers to insurance coverage
questions matter because those affected are often riding a fine line
between survival and complete financial destitution.
Insurance coverage disputes that center on construing insurance policy
language include such far-ranging issues as:
a) Does a clause in a liability insurance policy that purports to exclude
losses from a “pollutant” catch only industrial pollution such as dumping
glowing toxic liquid into a lake? Or does it also avoid payment for damages
from a slip and fall on spilled bleach (a chemical “pollutant?”) in a grocery
store aisle?1
b) Does the loss of both towers at the World Trade Center during the 9/11
attacks constitute one insured “occurrence” or two?2
c) Can a business’ income losses resulting from a government-mandated
closure order during the COVID-19 pandemic be covered if the policy
requires “direct physical loss of or damage to” the policyholder’s
property?3
1. Where a “pollutant” is defined in the policy as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant
or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.” See, e.g. Kent
Farms, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 140 Wn2d 396, 998 P2d 292 (Wash. 2000); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason
and Pollution: Construing the “Absolute” Pollution Exclusion in Context and in Light of its Purpose and
Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1 (1998).
2. Compare SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop., LLC, 222 F. Supp. 2d 385, 398-99
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding as a matter of law that policy with language defining occurrence as “all losses
or damages that are attributable directly or indirectly to one cause or to one series of similar causes”
defined September 11 damage to World Trade Towers as one occurrence), with SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co v.
World Trade Ctr. Props. LLC, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1103, at *15-16(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2003 (policy
ambiguous as to meaning of occurrence when policy speaks of a “series of losses . . . arising out of one
event”). “Eventually, a jury found two occurrences for insurance policies [without the] ‘batching’
language [of the Willis brokerage binder containing a broad definition of occurrence].” JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL, ERIK S. KNUTSEN & PETER N. SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 7 (5th ed. 2020). The
jury verdict was upheld by the trial court and on appeal. See Court Upholds Juries’ Rulings on World
Trade Center Claims, INS. J. (Oct. 19, 2006), https://perma.cc/AQ5P-X6KW. See also Rodd Zolkos,
‘Wilprop’ case changes the industry, INS. J. (Sept. 11, 2011), https://perma.cc/7RAK-XLFU (discussing
creation and use of Willis Wilprop binder originally intended by policyholder to reduce need to pay
multiple deductibles but as applied to 9/11 loss of Towers reduced available property insurance coverage
by more than $1 billion).
3. Compare Studio 417, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, 2020 WL 4692385 (W.D. Mo.)
(Aug. 12, 2020) (applying Missouri law) (possibility of coverage for COVID-19-related closure losses

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/5

2

Stempel and Knutsen: Rejecting Word Worship

2021]

REJECTING WORD WORSHIP

563

Courts deciding these disputes have two possible approaches to an
insurance policy construction question: (1) a strict, literalist approach to
the words at issue, or (2) a more contextual, functionalist approach. The
approach taken may fundamentally change the result. For instance, the
characterization of a bleach spill as either a matter of standard premises
liability or a pollution event illustrates the impact of the different judicial
approaches. A rigidly textualist court would likely hold that household
bleach could be a “pollutant” because bleach fits the broad definition of
“pollutant” in the policy. Under this analysis, coverage would be denied.
Contextualist courts examine the purpose of the policy and, in the
bleach example, would consider the purpose of the pollution exclusion.
An examination of the insurer underwriting information about that
pollution exclusion in an all-risk liability policy would reveal insurers’
intention to avoid paying for large-scale industrial “smoke-stack” type
pollution, because such pollution could cause widespread losses and be
mitigated through safety efforts. Insurers did not mean to target slip-andfall injuries from household bleach spills in grocery stores. A
contextualist court would conclude that reading the exclusion broadly to
catch this sort of loss is inconsistent with the purpose of the exclusion: to
exclude from coverage those losses arising from industrial-type pollution.
Despite the departure from strict adherence to textualism signalled in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts4 in 1981, courts continue to
embrace a textualist approach in contract interpretation5 cases, including

because use of property was restricted) with Diesel Barbershop, LLC v. State Farm Lloyds, 479 F. Supp.
3d 353, 360-362 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2020) (granting a motion to dismiss because the coronavirus did
not cause a direct physical loss, and “the loss needs to have been a ‘distinct, demonstrable physical
alteration of the property.’”). See also Erik S. Knutsen & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Infected Judgment:
Creating Conventional Wisdom and Insurance Coverage Denial in a Pandemic, 27 CONN. INS. L.J. 185
(2020) (reviewing COVID-19 coverage cases and criticizing courts taking unduly narrow construction of
terms “direct physical loss or damage”).
4. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 200-229 (1981)
(taking what observers have termed a “contextual” approach to determining the meaning of disputes
contracts terms). See also JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 3.12 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing Restatement
(Second) of Contracts approach as contextual and consistent with functional approach of Yale Professor
Arthur Corbin, as contrasted with more formalist approach of Harvard Professor Herbert Williston); E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.8 (4th ed. 2004) (portraying Restatement (Second) approach as
functional and contextual).
5. For purposes of this paper, we will generally treat the terms “interpretation” and
“construction” as synonyms although we recognized the long-standing technical view of many that
interpretation is the process of determining what a text means while construction is the process of the
application of the text and giving it legal effect. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of
Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017) (noting the distinction and citing to sources). See also
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1951) at section 534 (“interpretation” is about
understanding what ideas the language in a contract induces in people; “construction” is the determination
of the legal operation of the contract).
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insurance cases.6 Scholars either cheer on7 or chastise courts for any
perceived deviation from the textualist approach.8 However, textualism
6. See, e.g., Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135
(Fla. 1998) (giving literal and broad application to pollution exclusion in general liability policy to
preclude coverage for architecture firm sued when its spill of a blueprint machine released arsenic that
emitted fumes requiring evacuation of building); E.C. Fogg, II. v. Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
E.C. Fogg, 711 So. 2d 1135 (1998) (same, barring coverage due to pollution exclusion when crop duster
sued for accidental direct spraying on farmer and sheriff’s deputy inspecting crop land); Allen v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992) (giving strict enforcement to household
exclusion in homeowner’s policy barring coverage for intra-family claims and rejecting reasonable
expectations approach in almost strident terms; also seemingly taking absolute view that because
insurance policy forms must be approved by state insurance regulator, policy language cannot be regarded
as unclear, unfairly surprising, unconscionable, or violative of public policy).
In Chestnut Associates Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 17 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (M.D. Fla. 2014),
the federal trial court applying Florida law held that the pollution exclusion applied where a pool
technician “sexually pleasured himself” in a client’s pool, causing alleged property damage to the pool.
The case offers some comic relief but illustrates a jurisprudence of silly textual literalism.
7. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW (2015) (textualist manifesto);
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005) (generally approving of
textualism as preferred interpretative methodology). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries
Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation – and the Irreducible Roles of
Values and Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV., 685, 685 (2014) (noting that empirical research
suggests that “judicial ideology matters more than methodology in determining interpretative outcomes”
and rejecting “the frequent claim of textualists that their theory much more stringently restrains valuebased decision making than does purposivism”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006); Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of
Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25 (1994) (discussing the respective textualism of the Justices
concerning constitutional text).
Although the bulk of scholarly writing regarding interpretation theory has focused on statutory
interpretation, similar but less voluminous writings for and against textualism are found regarding contract
law. See, e.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation,
89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991) (noting importance of context but also that contextual inquiry has less
readily apparent boundaries than textual inquiry); E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of
Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967) (assessing traditional and modern approaches to interpretation,
including plain meaning and parol evidence rules).
8. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 29-41 (2015) (advocating textualism and
criticizing interpretation deemed insufficiently deferential to text); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Foreword
to READING LAW, at xxi-xxvi (endorsing textualism in statutory interpretation and arguing that
“[l]egislative intent is a fiction.”). See also Bryan Garner, LawProse Lesson #206: Statutory and
Contractual Interpretation, https://perma.cc/92S3-7YJU (“all judges are textualists first (‘We begin with
the words’ is a mantra in judicial opinions), even if they then move on to consider other matters, such as
their own policy preferences. They all start with the text.”). Garner argues that the most “important skill”
that is “generally lacking among law-school graduates” is “[a]most certainly” the “ability to develop,
hone, and deliver arguments about the interpretation of contracts and statutes.”
Garner’s proposed remedy, unsurprisingly, is better facility discussing the text of contracts and
statutes as he endorses greater use of canons of construction addressing word meaning, particularly the
ordinary-meaning canon, the “negative-implication” canon (a/k/a expression unius est exclusion alterius),
the last-antecedent canon, the associated-words canon, and the surplusage canon. The latter posits that
“[i]f possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect. None should needlessly be given an
interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.”).
A full assessment of these canons and their ability to mislead is beyond the scope of this article.
The primary defect of almost all canons of construction addressing word meaning is that they are often
inaccurate in particular situations and arguably rest on the completely unrealistic premises about the
drafting of legal documents. Canons are problematic to the extent they suggest that writers of contract
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has not been displaced.9 Most scholars regard that the Restatement
(Second) of Contract’s construction methodology as fully accepted in
only a minority of states.10
In short, textualism has been resilient and ascendant in the 40 years of
the post-Restatement era.11 One need only briefly search the case reports
to find example after example of courts saying that their task is limited to
reading the text of the document at issue,12 or it is not the court’s job to
forms or statutes never speak redundantly, always appreciate the connotative value of words in a series,
always remember to include everything that should be in a list, and know the rules of grammar cold.
Canons, like policy text itself, should not be treated as talismanic but applied in conjunction with other
interpretative factors.
9. A similar phenomenon followed the alleged dethroning of legal formalism by the legal realist
movement. The prevailing narrative is that legal formalism dominated American law until the rise of the
legal realism movement in the 1920s and 1930s which immediately destabilized the dominance of
formalism and eventually dethroned it, as expressed in the oft-quoted comment that “we are all realists
now.” Although formalism was not eliminated or repealed in the manner of a discredited scientific theory,
legal formalism was scaled back, modified, or fused with legal realist insights in what might be called the
Harvard Legal Process school of thought that dominated American law at mid-Century. We would also
characterize much non-formalist legal reasoning as functionalist. See STEMPEL, KNUTSEN, & SWISHER,
supra note 2, § 2.03 (5th ed. 2020); Peter N. Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off
the Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1991). See also TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE,
INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 29 (2017) (regarding distinction as “useful” and
noting applications). Others would term it instrumentalism. See, e.g., BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 5-15 (1994). Or a matter of “text versus context.” James M. Fischer,
Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation? Text versus Context, 24 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 995 (1992). For contract law in particular, the prevailing view is that the more functionalist or
contextualist contract construction of the 1950-1980 time period has been replaced in substantial degree
by a neo-classical approach that is both more formalist and more textualist than the Second Restatement
and much of the caselaw of the 1950-1980 era. Fully discussing and assessing this history is beyond the
scope of this article and a project in itself. See generally CONTRACT, LAW OF, OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF AMERICAN POLITICAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (2012); (Donald T. Critchlow & Philip R. VanderMeer,
eds.) at 188-92; JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE
(1992); KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT (1990).
10. See PERILLO, supra note 4, § 3.12 at 142-43 (noting that “the Restatement (Second) is
generally in accord with Corbin” but that courts have only “warily” applied the reasonable expectations
aspect of the Restatement (e.g., 211), usually limiting it to “ambiguities and inconspicuous language”)
(citation omitted).
11. See John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 869 (2002) (noting that rise in contextual or functional approach to contract construction was never
as dramatic as posited by critics and counter-revolution of sorts in which courts continued or even
increased emphasis on text of contract documents); Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost
Everything You May or May Not Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 577 (2001)
(noting increase in contract litigation and its frequent disposition by motion practice based on judicial
finding of sufficiently clear text); Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract
Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000) (noting dominance of objective theory
and its implicit empowerment of courts to decide cases based on judges’ assessment of whether contract
document text admits of more than one reasonable reading). See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 1.7
(reviewing history of academic debate over nature of contract law, contract theory, and approaches to
adjudicating contract disputes).
12. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527 (1947) (also published as a monograph by Association of the Bar of the City of New York based on
address of the same name) (“Read the statute. Read the statute. Read the statute”). Less often quoted
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“rewrite” a contract.13 As in the public debate over constitutional law,
“strict constructionist” judges are celebrated,14 and the legal literature
teems with the view that close reading of text is required to provide the
certainty and predictability required by law, commerce, and society at
large.15
and appreciated is Justice Frankfurter’s more nuanced view that “the notion that because the words of a
statute are plain the meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious over-simplification.” United States v.
Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Frankfurter, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
at 528-35 (noting variety of means of reading and understanding statutory text).
For an interesting observation that supports the view of de-emphasizing the primacy of text,
see Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not Reading the Statutes, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 283, 284 (2007)
(noting potential differences between statutes as enacted and as codified and that Frankfurter read the
former) (“The Code is – no disrespect intended – a Frankenstein’s Monster of session laws. The Code is
made by taking the session laws, hacking them to pieces, rearranging them, and stitching them back
together in a way that gives them false life. Many pieces are altered, and many others are thrown away.
The result is something like a Cliffs Notes guide to the real law.”). See also id at 291-92.
13. See, e.g., Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 753 (Tex. 2006) (“courts must enforce
the contract as made by the parties, and cannot make a new contract for them”); HECI Exploration Co.
v. Neel, 982 S.W.23d 744, 753 (Tex. 2006) (“Our decisions have repeatedly emphasized that courts
‘cannot make contracts for [the] parties.’”) (quoting Gulf Prod. Co. v. Kishi, 103 S.W.2d 965, 968 (Tex.
1937), which in turn quotes Freeport Sulphur Co. v. Am. Sulphur Royalty Co. of Tex. 6 S.W.2d 1039,
1490; In Re Arbitration Between Argonaut Midwest Ins. Co. v. Gen. Reinsurance Corp., ); Fernandez v.
Homestar at Miller Cove, Inc., 935 So.2d 547, 551 (Fla. App. 2006) (courts are “powerless to rewrite [a]
contract to make it more reasonable or advantageous to one of the parties…or to substitute [the court’s]
judgments for that of the parties to the contract in order to relieve one of the parties form the apparent
hardships of an improvident bargain.” This sentiment is sufficiently strong that it also discourages courts
from severing portions of a statute or contract that violates law or policy. See David H. Gans, Severability
as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639 (2008); John Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV.
203 (1993). See, e.g., Golden Road Motor Inn v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151 (Nev. 2016) (court finds restrictive
covenant overbroad and refuses to revise or “blue pencil” to bring covenant in compliance with public
policy limits) (decision later legislatively overruled in part by Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.195(5) requiring
judicial editing of overbroad restrictive covenant to conform to legal limits).
14. In the arena of lay politics, the standard statement by politicians appointing judges or of
judicial candidates is that they will apply the law as written and not engage in “judicial activism.” See,
e.g., DAVID MCKAY, AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 293 (2009) (“One of Richard Nixon’s 1968
campaign pledges had been to replaced the liberals of the Warren Court with ‘strict constructionists’, or
conservatives less prone to the advancement of civil rights and liberties characteristic of the Warren era.”);
Reuters Staff, Trump to nominate ‘strict constructionist’ to Supreme Court: Pence, Reuters (Jan 26, 2017),
https://perma.cc/U38Y-DGDY (characterizing “strict construction” as “a manner of interpreting the U.S.
Constitution using a literal and narrow definition of language in the document without regard to changes
that have occurred in American society since the 18th century document was written.”); Jeffrey Rosen,
Can Bush Deliver a Conservative Court? N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2004), available at https://perma.cc/T39J66XS (noting President George W. Bush’s frequent promises to supporters to nominate strict
constructionists).
15. See Shawn Bayern, Contract Meta-Interpretation, 49 UNIV. CAL.-DAVIS L. REV. 1097 (2016)
(noting this claim of textualists and response of contextualists; further arguing that parties may have
different preferences regarding interpretation and courts should determine and apply the preferences of
particular the contracting parties before the court); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 938-39 (2010) (endorsing textualism on the basis of both posited
judicial restraint and consumption of fewer judicial resources due to reduction in need to consider extrinsic
evidence); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective body”). See,
e.g., Maura D. Corrigan, Textualism in Action: Judicial Restraint on the Michigan Supreme Court, 8 TEX.
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Textualism is one of the core orthodoxies of American law and dispute
resolution, even though both modern cognitive science and practical
experience have shown its limits. Undue reverence for text abounds even
when inapt.16 Deviation from textualism is minimally met with raised
eyebrows and often condemned as an undue departure from settled law.
Departures from strict textualism, particularly in insurance cases, are
often erroneously and unfairly treated as episodes of lawless judicial
activism or policymaking by judges. This view is misplaced. A more
integrative indicia of contract term meaning does not excessively
empower judges relative to legislatures, executives, and private parties
but instead permits courts to help ensure that statutes, contracts, and
insurance policies function in a manner consistent with the intent,
purpose, and operation of the assenting parties.

REV. L. & POL. 261 (2003) (Chief Justice of Michigan Supreme Court argues for textualist approach to
constrain judiciary and further democratic values); Clint Bolick, The Case for Legal Textualism, Hoover
Institution (Feb. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/XCR5-JTUA (Arizona Supreme Court Justice and former
prominent lawyer for conservative causes argues that “textualist judges provide the greatest possible
guarantee that the judiciary will safeguard the Constitution and the rule of law.”). For refutation of the
textualist claim of stability and neutrality in the context of personal jurisdiction issues, see Peter J. Smith,
Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883 (2008).
Although Judge Easterbrook and Justices Corrigan and Bolick were addressing constitutional
and statutory interpretation, their assessments are frequently applied to contract textualism, and probably
for similar reasons, which may explain why it appears that the most vigorous textualists are often political
conservatives. To be sure, a political liberal may enjoy giving broad construction to language in order to
aid a consumer, former employee, or policyholder seeking coverage (e.g., broad application of the “all
sums” language in the standard CGL policy), but conservatives appear attracted to textualism out of
concern that departure from policy or other contract document text will result in government interference
(by the judiciary) somehow interfering with private bargains. Although we are sympathetic to this
sentiment, we think it misplaced in many contract disputes, particularly insurance coverage matters where
product-like policy text is standardized, typically unread (and not available until after sale) and does not
result from specific negotiation and discussion as in the classic bargain model of contract.
16. See, e.g., Maxine Furs. Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 426 Fed. App’x 687 (11th Cir. 2011)
(applying Alabama law) (smell of Indian curry from adjacent restaurant prompts suit by fur shop where
merchandised affected by aroma; restaurant not covered by CGL policy due to pollution exclusion; no
application of absurd result canon); Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 809 N.W. 2d 529 (Wis. 2012)
(bat guano deposited in vacation home during off-season falls within pollution exclusion of homeowners
policy; no application of absurd result canon); Owens v. Owens, 6 S.E. 794 (N.C. 1888) (wife who is
accessory to husband’s murder can nonetheless obtain distribution of property); Dan v. Brown, 4 Cow.
483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) (literal language of will applied in spite of beneficiary killing testator); (same
re beneficiary of life insurance policy). This view became increasingly recognized as wrong after Riggs
v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889), which created a common law “slayer’s rule” (albeit over a
dissent). Even after Riggs, enough courts were hesitant to depart from textual literalism to require
legislation codifying the slayer’s rule, which is now the norm. See John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property
by Wilfully Killing Another – A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1936).
See also Tumlinson v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 775 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989) (written term seemingly clear on its face may be deemed ambiguous if literal application renders
an absurd result); Linda D. Jellum, But That Is Absurd! Why Specific Absurdity Undermines Textualism,
76 BROOK. L. REV. 917 (2011) (collecting examples of application of absurd result canon in context of
statutory construction).
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After a preliminary sketch of the preferred Integrative Approach to
insurance policy construction, this Article briefly17 examines textualism
in the insurance context and finds it flawed. This Article then outlines the
proper role of the judiciary as an institution that should assist the
operation of contracts and statutes. Courts need not be cabined by
textualism to “stay in their lane” relative to other branches as well as the
decision-making preferences of the parties.18 Rather, courts can adopt a
broader, more Integrative Approach to construction without violating
traditional norms of the judicial role.19 Finally, this Article proposes a
workable Integrative Approach to the construction of insurance policies
and other contracts. This approach will enable judges to vindicate the
objectives of these instruments.
The integrative solution is not radical. It attempts to draw the legal
profession back to reality, where risk management principles, commerce,
and social institutions all necessarily impact the construction of meaning
in a policy term. Textualism’s staunch resistance to the value added by
contextual information is comparatively extreme.
I. PRECURSORS TO THE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH
The magnetic push and pull between textual and contextual approaches
17. The shortcomings of textualism would support a longer discussion or an entire article or book.
We hope, however, that we present enough criticism to persuade readers that embracing a narrow
textualism risks more erroneous contract construction than do broader approaches such as the very broad
Integrative Approach we champion. See also Mark A. Lemley, Chief Justice Webster, 106 IOWA L. REV.
299 (2020) (criticizing textual literalism and reliance on dictionaries); William N. Eskridge, The New
Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 7) (criticizing hidden use of value judgments in purportedly objective textual analyses); Miranda
McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say, An Empirical Investigation of Justices Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning
Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129 (2008) (finding substantial use of discretion in
assessing meaning despite Justice’s claim of constraint in assessing textual meaning); James Brudney &
Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1 (2005) (finding selective, inconsistent use of linguistic canons favored by textualists); Ellen Aprill, The
Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998) (finding
inconsistent use of dictionaries in textualist opinions).
18. The phrase “freedom of contract” has become something of a cliché but at its core contains a
powerful public policy goal: allow individuals and entities to engage in transactions that are viewed as
mutually beneficial without excessive government interference. But contracting parties are agreeing upon
purchase of certain things, services or objectives rather than agreeing on documentary language. The
language of contract documents, although important, is not all-important, particularly when such language
is unlikely to be read and analyzed and when disclosures are of limited efficacy. See generally OMRI
BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
19. Again attacking conventional wisdom, we do not think the judiciary exceeds its role when
judges do more than assess the face of the text of contract documents (or statutes for that matter). Rather,
judges are more true to their proper role in a coordinate branch of government when they are more readily
able to construe insurance policies and other contracts in a manner that facilitates their effective operation
as envisioned by the parties and which serves the context of the transaction represented by the contract.
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to insurance policy interpretation is not new. That the United States
appears to have landed on the textualist side of contract interpretation
questions is also not new. But that has not always been the case in all
American jurisdictions. Rather, three major and influential legal episodes
proposed contextualist approaches in the past and developed compelling
safeguards around the trappings of textualism. However, these
developments, over time, became cabined by the textualism movement.
In short, contextualism did not stick. The Integrative Approach proposed
in this Article builds on the solid foundations of historical, widely
accepted approaches to create a modern comprehensive approach to
insurance policy construction.
A. The California Supreme Court’s Pacific Gas & Electric v. Thomas
Drayage Opinion
In the 1968 decision Pacific Gas & Electric v. G.W. Thomas Drayage
& Rigging Co.,20 the California Supreme Court adopted a more lenient
attitude to admitting extrinsic evidence of contractual meaning compared
to the “plain meaning” practices that had come before. The Thomas
Drayage Court signaled that context matters. Courts cannot merely look
at the text of a contract to determine meaning, by imbuing whatever the
judge “thought” was the “plain meaning” of the text. Though subsequent
cases have been less openly contextualist and more textualist in rhetoric,
the Thomas Drayage decision, written by celebrated jurist Justice Roger
J. Traynor21 remains good law in California. Although many subsequent
state Supreme Court opinions have been more textualist in tone 22 and
application,23 the state’s jurisprudence as a whole has retained a relatively
20. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
21. Thomas Drayage was authored by the celebrated jurist Justice Roger J. Traynor, a former
University of California-Berkeley law professor, primarily known as a tax expert when he was appointed
to the California Supreme Court in 1940. He is today largely remembered for leading tort and contract
opinions written while he was on the Court as either an Associate Justice (1940-1964) or as Chief Justice
(1964-1970). See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (urging use of strict product
liability in concurring opinion); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)
(establishing strict product liability as state law); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (establishing
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress); Drennan v. Star Paving Co, 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958)
(permitting use of promissory estoppel to create contract obligations); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d
145 (Cal. 1965) (leading opinion discussing the “economic loss” doctrine and its limitation on tort-style
remedies for product failure). See also Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (striking down state
miscegenation statute); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942) (eliminating mutuality
requirement for defensive use of collateral estoppel).
22.
Although Thomas Drayage remains good law in California, its rate of invocation has
declined as more recent cases have become more popular citations for summarizing state contract
construction doctrine. But these cases, although perhaps not emphasizing receptivity to extrinsic
evidence, have not retreated entirely from the Traynor formula.
23. See, e.g., Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc., 139 P.3d 56, 58-60 (Cal. 2006) (citing Thomas
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contextualist approach in spite of reduced citation to the Thomas Drayage
opinion.24
In Thomas Drayage, the parties entered a contract to replace the metal
cover of the plaintiff’s steam turbine. The defendant agreed to perform
the work “at (its) own risk and expense” and to “indemnify” the plaintiff
“against all loss, damage, expense and liability resulting from . . . injury
to property, arising out of or in any way connected with the performance
of this contract.”25 During the course of the work, the cover fell and
damaged the rotor of the turbine. The plaintiff sued for the repair cost on
the theory that the contract indemnified the plaintiff for damage to all
property regardless of ownership. However, the defendant argued that the
clause was meant only to cover injury to property of third parties and not
the plaintiff’s property. The defendant supported its argument with
admissions from plaintiff’s agents and evidence regarding the course of
dealing based on its past contracting practices. The lower court refused
evidence related to the intent of the contractual terms in the agreement.
Instead, the lower court construed the terms based on the court’s
determination of the term’s plain meaning.
The Thomas Drayage Court held that, by failing to admit extrinsic
evidence to interpret what the parties meant by this indemnity clause, a
court:
determines the meaning of the instrument in accordance with the ‘extrinsic
evidence of the judge’s own linguistic education and experience.’ (3
Corbin on Contracts (1960 ed.) (1964 Supp. s 579, p. 225, fn. 56).) The
Drayage) (finding employment at will and discharge at any time language in job contract clear and not
susceptible to being construed as contract requiring cause for discharge as advocated by employee
plaintiff) (but see 139 P.3d at 62 (Baxter, J., joined by Moreno, J.), refusing to join majority’s “general
endorsement” of Thomas Drayage); Bank of the West, infra, note 24 at 552-53 (finding policyholder’s
proffered interpretation inconsistent with context of transaction and insurance product as well as precedent
from other jurisdictions); Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 682 P.2d 1100, 1104-05 (Cal. 1984) (finding
policy language not receptive to construction insured sought to place upon it through extrinsic evidence;
also finding evidence unpersuasive); Sarnecky v. D’Amato Conversano, Inc., 2018 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 899 (Feb. 8, 2018) at *29-*30 (citing Thomas Drayage) (rejecting proffer of “parol evidence”
(arguably extrinsic evidence rather than parol) on ground that text language was clear and subjective party
intent insufficient to vary clear text); Edward W. Scott Elec. Co. v. Thompson Pac. Constr., Inc., 2018
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 768 (Jan. 30, 2018) at *20-*24 (citing Thomas Drayage) (finding text not
“reasonably susceptible” to construction advocated by litigant).
24. See, e.g., Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch. Inc. 900 P.2d 619, 627 (Cal. 1995) (focusing on facial
ambiguity of policy text and defining ambiguity as language capable of two or more reasonable
constructions, a situation that justifies consideration of extrinsic evidence and application of contra
proferentem doctrine in which unclear language is resolved against drafter of the language); Bank of the
West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 545-46 (Cal. 1992) (setting forth similar ground rules of contract
construction). See also MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 31 Cal. 4th 635, 648 (2003) (discussing
insurance contract interpretation norm that exclusions are narrowly construed against insurer and in favor
of policyholder). The California Supreme Court last cited Thomas Drayage in Riverisland Cold Storage,
Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 321 (Cal. 2013).
25. Thomas Drayage, 442 P.2d at 643.
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exclusion of testimony that might contradict the linguistic background of
the judge reflects a judicial belief in the possibility of perfect verbal
expression. (9 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) s 2461, p. 187.) This
belief is a remnant of a primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent
meaning of words.26

The court held that the threshold question for admitting extrinsic
evidence of word meaning should not be whether the word appears to the
court to be plain and unambiguous. Instead, the test should be whether
“the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the
language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.”27 For the court, the
relevance of the parties’ intentions are paramount because words “do not
have absolute and constant referents” and have no “fixed meaning.”28
Extrinsic evidence should be admitted because courts cannot “presuppose
a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not attained.”29
According to Justice Traynor, there is real danger in leaving a
contractual term’s plain meaning solely to a court’s discretion, because
courts could mistakenly attribute a meaning that the parties never
intended.30 Therefore, “rational interpretation requires at least a
preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the
intention of the parties.”31 That evidence includes testimony about the
surrounding circumstances of the making of the agreement, as well as
evidence of the object, nature and subject matter of the agreement.
Although the decision has its critics,32 it has not created the problems
of which it is sometimes accused.33 Contract and insurance law function
26. Id.
27. Id. at 644.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.at 645.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Trident Center v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988)
(purporting to grudgingly apply California law after considerable criticism of Thomas Drayage). But, as
discussed herein, Judge Alex Kosinski in Trident Center paints a misleading picture of California law as
well as misapplying it.
33. For example, the Trident Center opinion portrayed Thomas Drayage as creating a body of
California law that made it impossible for commercial actors to rely on contract text. See 847 F.2d at 569,
contending that Thomas Drayage:
“casts a long shadow of uncertainty over all transactions negotiated and executed under the law of
California.” [Agreements with] contract language that is devoid of ambiguity [are subject to]
“costly and protracted litigation [that] cannot be avoided if one party has a strong enough motive
for challenging the contract. While this rule creates much business for lawyers and an occasional
windfall to some clients, it leads only to frustration and delay for most litigants and clogs already
overburdened courts.
It also chips away at the foundation of our legal system. By giving credence to the idea that words
are inadequate to express concepts, [Thomas Drayage] undermines the basic principle that
language provides meaningful constraint on public and private conduct. If we are unwilling to
say that parties, dealing face to face, can come up with language that binds them, how can we send
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more than adequately in California, the nation’s largest state34 with the
world’s sixth largest economy.35
anyone to jail for violating statutes consisting of mere words . . . How can courts ever enforce
decrees . . . ?
Although impressive rhetorically, the statement was hyperbole in 1988 and looks even more ridiculous
40 years later in light of the continued economic growth and legal importance of California that seems
unlikely to have occurred if the state was really saddled with unworkably unpredictable contract law.
Judge Kosinski was – by his own admission – engaging in a bit of a vanity attack on Justice
Traynor. See Alex Kosinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 29899 (2000) (“I had grown tired of law clerks who thought California Chief Justice Traynor was the cat’s
pajamas because he didn’t believe that any contract could be interpreted without the use of extrinsic
evidence.”).
Perhaps most disturbing about Trident Center is that the case is simply wrong on its own terms.
One need not apply an external critique to Trident Center. Trident Center on its face is internally
inconsistent. The opinion states (847 F.3d at 567) that “the clause on which Trident relies [in seeking to
accelerate payment of a loan without penalty] is not on its face reasonably susceptible to Trident’s
proffered interpretation.” According to the plain language of the text, “[w]hether to accelerate repayment
of the loan in the event of default is entirely [the lender’s] decision. The contract [document text] makes
this clear at several points.” The court found it “difficult to imagine language that could more clearly
assign to [the lender] the exclusive right to decide whether to declare a default, whether and when to
accelerate, and whether, having chosen to take advantage of any of its remedies, to rescind the process
before its completion.”
In other words, the language of the loan agreement is not reasonably susceptible to a
construction that would allow the borrower (Trident Center was a joint venture of two law firms to
purchase an office building in West Los Angeles where the firms continue to operate) to accelerate
repayment of the loan without penalty, an issue that arose because the loan carried a high interest rate and
rates had dropped substantially within a few years of the making of the loan.
The finding of no susceptibility to permitting prepayment without penalty should have ended
the case and avoided any significant detour for discussion of extrinsic evidence. Thomas Drayage
explicitly states that, to be permitted, extrinsic evidence must advance a construction of the text at issue
for which the text is reasonably susceptible. The Trident Center court ignores this aspect of Thomas
Drayage, despite its finding of textual clarity in the loan agreement.
Trident Center, despite its strident rhetoric, fails to make the case against Thomas Drayage.
Trident Center likewise fails to undermine the case for the Restatement (Second) approach to contract
interpretation or this article’s proposed Integrative Approach.
34. See California Passes France as World’s 6th-Largest Economy, FORTUNE, June 18, 2016.
But see Geoffrey Miller, Bargains BiCoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475
(2010) (noting business preference for choosing New York contract law because of its perceived greater
textual orientation than that of California).
35. In our view, California contract and insurance law function pretty well. At a minimum, the
state’s approach to contract construction does not appear to have thwarted growth and commercial
development. To be sure, one can argue that California would be even more of an economic powerhouse
were it not saddled with Thomas Drayage and its tolerant approach to extrinsic evidence. But we are
skeptical. And insurers win more than their share of coverage disputes in California. See, e.g., PPG
Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1999) (insurer that acted in bad faith in failing
to defend is not responsible for punitive damages component of award against policy); Buss v. Superior
Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997) (insurer that defended case where only one of 19 causes of action was
potentially covered may seek repayment of portion of fees).
Buss is additionally interesting because it not only ruled for the insurer in permitting it to seek
recoupment of counsel fees but in doing so rejected a strict textual analysis in favor of what the court
implicitly regarded as a more equitable approach in a case such as Buss in which the insurer defended a
case in which only one of the nineteen claims for relief was potentially covered. But the language of the
policy in question, standard form CGL language, states that the insurer has a duty to defend “suits.” It
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B. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts,36 promulgated by the
American Law Institute in 1981, took a decidedly contextualist approach
to contract interpretation, tracking the same reasoning as the California
Supreme Court in Thomas Drayage. It indicated that courts should
interpret the meaning of contractual terms in light of the drafting
circumstances, with the “principle purpose of the parties” given “great
weight.”37 An agreement should be interpreted as a whole, and the
“generally prevailing meaning” of words at issue controls “unless a
different intention is manifested.”38 The Restatement also authorizes
courts to weigh evidence regarding parties’ courses of contractual
performance.39 Finally, the intention of the contracting parties should be
interpreted as consistent with relevant course of performance, course of
dealing, or usage of trade evidence.40
The meaning, as derived from the intentions of the contracting parties,
thus reigns supreme in both the Restatement approach and Thomas
Drayage. The Restatement adopts a form of the reasonable expectations
doctrine as found in insurance law.41
does not say the duty to defend is limited to potentially covered claims.
36. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 200-229 (1981).
37. Id. § 202(1).
38. Id. § 202(3) (a).
39. Id. § 202(4).
40. Id. § 202(5).
41. The reasonable expectations of contracting parties is an important tool of contract
interpretation used by almost all courts in varying degrees. But under a strong form of the reasonable
expectations approach (sometimes labeled a reasonable-expectations “doctrine”), policyholder
expectations of coverage will be honored by the court even if policy language is clearly to the contrary,
particularly where the language, even if clear, is not prominently displayed in the insurance policy or
related documents. The doctrine is most associated with Harvard Law Professor Robert E. Keeton, later
a federal judge – See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Rights At Variance With Policy Provisions – Pt. I, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970) (focusing on coverage issues); Keeton, Insurance Rights At Variance With
Policy Provisions – Pt. II, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1970) (focusing on claims handling and settlement) –
but has spawned a large body of literature. See, e.g., Peter N. Swisher, Symposium Introduction, 5 CONN.
INS. L.J. 1 (1998).
To summarize at the risk of over-simplifying, there is a “strong” form of the reasonable
expectations approach, that occasionally appears in judicial decisions. See, e.g., Atwater Creamery Co.
v. Western National Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985) (refusing to enforce theft provisions
requiring “visible marks of forced entry” for coverage despite clarity of language). But this is not the
norm. See Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323 (1986)
(noting initial enthusiasm for doctrine in wake of Keeton article but subsequent decline in use). Rather,,
policyholder reasonable expectations are often only considered if policy language is ambiguous See
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN , STEMPEL & KNUTSEN ON INSURANCE COVERAGE § 4.08 (4th
ed. 2016); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE
DISPUTES § 2.04 (16th ed. 2016); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the
Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of the Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J.
181 (1998) (noting use of modest form of reasonable expectations analysis across spectrum of contracts
and arguing for greater willingness to use strong form of approach for insurance disputes).
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C. The Pre-2018 Drafts of the Restatement of the Law of Liability
Insurance
Prior to its passage by the American Law Institute in 2019, the
Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance (“RLLI”)42 went through
numerous revisions. In the early pre-2018 drafts, the RLLI conveyed a
more lenient attitude toward extrinsic evidence on issues of insurance
policy construction than that of many courts and commentators. The pre2018 RLLI position mirrored the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Thomas Drayage.43 Notwithstanding that the RLLI was merely endorsing
a contract construction approach long used by California, which was
consistent with the ALI’s own Contracts Restatement, RLLI critics opined
that its contract construction sections were an invitation to anarchy that
would irreparably destabilize not only insurance law but American
commerce in general.44 The draft RLLI proposal, though quite deferential
to text (arguably more than the Restatement (Second) of Contracts), was
attacked for paying insufficient homage to the words of an insurance
policy.
The December 2017 RLLI draft stopped short of embracing the
contextual approach of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Instead,
it attempted to affirm deference to text but permit judicial consideration
of sufficiently instructive non-textual information about the meaning of a
disputed term. § 3 of the December 2017 RLLI draft became a lightning
rod for textualist rancor, despite its innocuous title, “The Presumption in
Favor of the Plain Meaning of Standard Form Insurance Policy Terms.”45
42. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE (2019)
(“RLLI”).
43. Pacific Gas & Electric v. Thomas Drayage, 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
44. Outside the context of the RLLI, deviations from textualism are often attacked by legal
formalists and political conservatives, although we do not think the Integrative Approach to contract
construction proposed in this article is inherently politically liberal . . . or even anti-establishment. In our
view, it is textualism that is more easily open to manipulation by judges than are the broader approaches
to contract construction such as the Integrative Approach.
Simply put, it is easier to twist (consciously or unconsciously) words than it is to twist a variety
of facts. A more comprehensive inquiry into contract meaning is often bounded by empirical data (e.g.,
evidence of party intent or purpose; information about background, history, or impact). This may be what
has made textualism popular with conservatives who want to read text narrowly to limit the reach of
legislation. See, e.g., General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (Supreme Court in opinion by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist finds that pregnancy discrimination does not violate Title VII in that it is not
disparate treatment in that only one sex can become pregnant; justifies ruling on textual and formalist
grounds).
45. Of the roughly 200 comments posted to the section of the ALI website devoted to the RLLI,
more than 150 were from insurers or insurer counsel. Many insurer comments attacked § 3. The common
thread of the criticism was that the § 3 methodology was not sufficiently deferential to plain meaning.
Beyond this, a number of the comments posited – apparently in all seriousness – that the § 3 methodology
undermined the very fabric of American contract law. As discussed below, we are tempted to say such
criticism borders on the ridiculous – except that it crosses the border into the ridiculous.
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It put forth the following approach to insurance policy construction:
(1) The plain meaning of an insurance policy term is the single meaning, if
any to which the language of the term is reasonably susceptible when
applied to the claim at issue, in the context of the insurance policy as a
whole, without reference to extrinsic evidence regarding the meaning of
the term. If the term does not have a plain meaning, it is interpreted under
the rules stated in §4 [regarding treatment of ambiguous terms].
(2) An insurance-policy term is interpreted according to its plain meaning
as defined in subsection (1), unless extrinsic evidence demonstrates to the
court that a reasonable person in the policyholder’s position would give the
term a different meaning. That different meaning must be one to which the
language of the term is reasonably susceptible in light of the
circumstances.46

§ 4 of the December 2017 RLLI regarding “Ambiguous Terms” generated
similar heat:47
(1) An insurance-policy term is ambiguous if there is more than one
meaning to which the language of the term is reasonably susceptible when
applied to the claim in question, without reference to extrinsic evidence
regarding the meaning of the term.
(2) When an insurance-policy term is ambiguous, the term is interpreted in
favor of the party that did not supply the term, unless the other party
persuaded that court that this interpretation is unreasonable in light of
extrinsic evidence.
(3) A standard-form insurance-policy term is interpreted as if it were
supplied by the insurer, without regard to which party actually supplied the
term, unless the policyholder has agreed in writing to a contrary
interpretative rule, in which case any term actually supplied by the
policyholder will be interpreted using that contrary interpretative rule.48

Adverse insurer reactions to the contract construction provisions of the
December 2017 RLLI were ill-taken and a bit puzzling. December 2017
RLLI § 3 raised the most concern among insurers not only because it goes
more directly to the interpretative enterprise but also because it did not
embrace the textual jurisprudence favored by many insurers. However, §

46. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE § 3 (AM. L. INST. Proposed Official Draft
2017).
47. The gist of the criticism of the pre-2018 RLLI contract construction proposal argued that
these provisions adopted an unduly favorable attitude toward extrinsic evidence and made for too
powerful a version of the traditional contra proferentem rule. The criticism is ill-taken. The § 4 approach
to ambiguity is consistent with mainstream contract jurisprudence. See PERILLO, supra note 4, at § 3.10;
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at §§ 7.7-7.14.
48. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 46, at § 4.
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3 neither adopted a strong form of the reasonable expectations doctrine
nor supported characterizations of the insurance policy that departed from
the contract model. Rather, § 3 adopted—without expressly saying so—
the approach taken by the California Supreme Court in Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage Co.,49 in which the Court declared:
The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a
written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and
unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to
prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably
susceptible.
A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written
instrument to its four-corners merely because it seems to the court to be
clear and unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the intention of
the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our
language has not attained.50

The pre-2018 version of RLLI § 3(2) did not openly advertise its
embrace of Thomas Drayage and characterized the decision as one
following what the RLLI termed the “contextual” approach.51 But it is
difficult to see much distinction between the two formulations. Although
the similarity may be lost on many readers, insurers and other textualists
understood that RLLI § 3(2) opened the door to more judicial
consideration of extrinsic evidence than they preferred. Consequently,
they attacked this portion with considerable intensity.
But the similarity, if not outright congruence, between Thomas
Drayage and the December 2017 RLLI § 3(2) logically should be seen as
a plus rather than a minus for the provision. Not only is the Thomas
Drayage approach reasonable and preferable to rigid textualism, but it has
also proven workable for fifty years in a large jurisdiction. Thomas
Drayage has been cited more than 1,000 times in subsequent cases. Just
49. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
50. 442 P.2d at 644 (citations omitted).
51. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE § 3, Reporters’ Note a. (AM. L.
INST. 2017) (“The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written
instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether it
appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its fact, but whether the offered evidence is relevant
to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.”)(quoting Thomas
Drayage).
By early 2018, the adverse reactions by powerful ALI constituencies resulted in the RLLI
moving toward a more traditionally textual black letter § 3. Insurer opposition to the Section and to the
RLLI generally spiked when it became know that the undertaking was changing from a Principles Project
to a Restatement. As the ALI explains well in its description of Restatements approved by the ALI
Council in January 2015 (reprinted at pp. x-xi of the RLLI), Restatements are not limited to endorsing the
majority rule but may favor a better rule of law so long as the proposal enjoys some judicial support. And
pre-2018 § 3(b) enjoyed substantial judicial support. But § 3 nonetheless triggered substantial insurer and
corporate opposition.
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as important, its enunciation of the treatment of text and receptiveness to
extrinsic information continues to be cited.
The RLLI has been changed from a document supporting California’s
Thomas Drayage approach to one adopting a neoclassical deference to
the text of the insurance policy and presumably related contract
documents as well. Although this is not complete retrogression, neither
is it progress.52 More importantly, it does not provide the optimal
methodology for construing insurance policies or resolving coverage
disputes. Of the available choices before it, the ALI Council opted for the
worst contract construction methodology. The December 2017 RLLI §
3, the Restatement (Second) of Contract’s contextual approach, and the
Thomas Drayage approach to extrinsic evidence are all superior
methodologies to the simplistic and unrealistic textualist approach to
plain meaning. Each is a precursor to the Integrative Approach to
insurance policy construction. Unfortunately, these more promising
approaches were arguably abandoned in the later stages of the RLLI
process.
II. THE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH: A PREVIEW
Insurance policy construction would benefit from an approach that
begins with an anchoring inquiry into the purpose of the policy: the
context of the policy and its sale as well as the underwriting and risk
management intent of the product as understood by insurer and
policyholder. At the outset, an interpreter should understand what the
transaction memorialized on the paper was designed to accomplish in
terms of risk management objectives, response to litigation, anticipated
scenarios, distribution of the risk of uncertainty, scope of contractual
commitment, and limitations.53

52. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 51, at Note a.
53. For insurance policy sales, particularly to consumers, there is relatively little bargaining over
terms and little discussion of specific policy language. Consequently, it will often be particularly
inappropriate to focus on policy text alone. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social
Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010) (advocating consideration of
socioeconomic function of insurance policy at issue as interpretative tool in addition to text or other indicia
of meaning); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 203 (2010)
(noting degree to which standardized insurance policies function as a form of private legislation and
suggesting more express use of statutory construction methodology in resolution of insurance coverage
disputes); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TRIAL & INS. L.J. 813 (2009) (noting
that typical insurance policies are purchased by most policyholders as a product intended for a specific
purpose of risk management and protection which enhances case for reasonable expectations analysis);
Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007) (noting product-like characteristics of insurance policies and arguing that
that supports more express economic analysis as interpretative tool).
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This understanding includes some appreciation of the market from
which the purchase of insurance emerged as well as the overall setting of
the transaction and the purpose of the agreement. For example, a
particular type of risk, such as liquor liability, may be well-established as
its own market with its own product, which supports application of the
liquor liability exclusion found in a standard commercial general liability
(CGL) policy despite arguments that this may run counter to the
expectations of the policyholder.54
Reading the policy terms in light of this background information, and
in the context of the whole policy at issue, is key to informing the
interpretive exercise. This lays the backdrop for the larger context of the
parties’ transaction. The internal policy definition of a term is itself given
great weight, but an Integrative Approach would allow courts to deploy
several legal canons (many specific to insurance) in a quest for equitable
meaning of a disputed term. Following the approach, a court would:
a) construe the agreement broadly with an eye to the policy’s risk
management objectives (the context of the agreement, the parties’
intentions, etc.);
b) read and assess the text of the policy in light of this background context,
and in light of the policy as a whole;
c) apply standard insurance canons of construction to terms under review;
i. coverage grants should be construed broadly (and burden of
persuasion on the policyholder)
ii. construe exclusions from coverage strictly and narrowly
iii. policy provisions that operate in the nature of exclusions should
thus be treated like exclusions;
iv. insurers bear the burden of proving the applicability of an
exclusion;55
v. exclusions should be subject to the reasonable rules of contra

54. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Making Liquor Immunity Worse: Nevada’s Undue Protection of
Commercial Hosts Evicting Vulnerable and Dangerous Patrons, 14 NEV. L.J. 866, 867-75 (2014)
(describing history and development of dram shop liability; an insurance market exists for alcohol-serving
establishments but is relatively “thin” in terms of participants and consumer choice of insurers); Randy
Maniloff, Broad Interpretation Given to Liquor Liability Exclusion: New ISO Exclusion Not Needed,
COVERAGE OPINIONS, Vo. 4, Issue 10 (Oct. 28, 2015) (noting consistency of judicial enforcement of
liquor liability exclusion). See, e.g., Capital Specialty Ins. Corp. v. PJD Entertainment of Worcester, 126
F. Supp. 3d 176 (D. Mass. 2015).
55. Broad construction of insuring agreements and narrow construction of exclusions is hornbook
law as expressed in treatises written by insurer counsel as well as policyholder counsel and law professors.
See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE DISPUTES § 2.02 (19th
ed. 2019); ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 14 (6th
ed. 2018); EUGENE ANDERSON, JORDAN STANZLER, AND LORELIE MASTERS, INSURANCE COVERAGE
LITIGATION § 2.02 at p. 2-23 (2d ed. 2004) (citing cases); PETER KALIS ET AL., THE POLICYHOLDER’S
GUIDE TO INSURANCE COVERAGE §§ 10.01, 20.04 (2004) (citing cases); STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra
note 41, § 2.06.
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proferentem,56 if such terms are ambiguous;
d) consider the following additional evidence of party intent,
understanding, objectives57 (not conditional on facial ambiguity of policy
text):
i. trade usage, technical manuals, industry materials, drafting
history;58
ii. evidence of specific intent of the parties, if available;
iii. an established course of performance or course of dealing of the
parties regarding administration of the insurance policy or program in
question.59
iv. decisions of other courts construing the same or similar language;
v. treatises, law review articles and other secondary sources that may
shed light on meaning;
e) consider the identity of the policy as something other than a contract (a
product, private legislation, social instrument or institution and outputs of
a regulated industry);60
56. By “reasonable” rules of contra proferentem, we mean – consistent with the Integrative
Approach we espouse – use of contra proferentem as a tiebreaker when other indicia of meaning do not
resolve linguistic uncertainty or establish the proper application of an insurance policy. See STEMPEL,
KNUTSEN & SWISHER, supra note 2, at § 2.05; STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 41, § 4.08 (4th ed. 2016).
Contra proferentem should in our view be a last resort rather than a first resort.
57. We wish to distinguish, as we think do most observers, between “intent” and “purpose” of an
insurance policy (or contract or statute generally). Intent refers to particular evidence of a party’s goal,
objective, or expectation regarding the transaction. For example, there may be correspondence between
the parties that specifically states whether the Pollution Point Power Plant or an uncharted island is within
or outside the scope of coverage. Purpose refers to a less specific and more generalized objective of the
transaction. For example, a general liability policy is designed to provide a defense claims of policyholder
negligence during ordinary operations that caused injury to the claimant while product recall insurance is
a separate product covering not the risk of inflicted injury but the need to remove product from the shelves
in response to discovery of contamination or related problems. See, e.g., McNeilab, Inc. v. North River
Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 525 (D.N.J. 1986), aff’d, 831 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1987) (CGL policy does not cover
recall expenses of Tylenol manufacturer’s removal of product from stores in wake of poisoning/tampering
problems; court influenced not only by exclusionary language in CGL policy but market practice of selling
recall insurance as separate product at separate premium).
58. Custom, practice, and trade usage are well-established as appropriate tools for contract
construction. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 219-222; PERILLO, supra note 4, § 3.17;
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 7.13.
59. These interpretative tools are well-established in law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS
§ 223; PERILLO, supra note 4, § 3.17; FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §§ 3.28, 7.13. Course of performance
and course of dealing are often distinguished in that the former tends to refer to conduct in connection
with a single contract performed over time or a series of closely related contracts while the latter tends to
refer to a longer and broader range of conduct by the parties in their contractual relations with one another.
60. Consideration of insurance as a product, private legislation, a regulated industry, or a
socioeconomic instrument has been advanced at some length in academic literature. See, e.g., Daniel
Schwarcz, A Product Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Coverage, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT, TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. (2008-2009); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV.
203 (2009-2010); Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2013)
(identifying conceptions of contract, public utility/regulated industry, product, and governance); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1489 (2010); Erik S. Knutsen, Auto Insurance as Social Contract: Solving Automobile Insurance
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f) if necessary, consider additional canons of construction or rules of
grammar;61
g) if necessary, consider contractual principles such as unconscionability,
illegality, or public policy;62
h) to the extent evidence regarding the contextual factors of intent, purpose,
custom, practice, course of dealing, business practices and the like conflicts
and has material relevance to the meaning of the policy, make apt use of

Coverage Disputes Through a Public Regulatory Framework, 48 ALBERTA L. REV. 715 (2011) (arguing
that the regulated and mandatory nature of Canadian automobile liability insurance is akin to a ‘social
contract’ with society over compensatory rights); Christopher French, Understanding Insurance Policies
as Non-Contracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial
Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535 (2017). But courts have been reluctant to openly use these alternative
or supplemental characterizations of insurance policies as a means of assessing policy meaning. They are
on occasion, however, applied as part of a reasonable expectations approach to construing policies. See,
e.g., C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co.., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975) (finding property policy
that purportedly covered theft but not where thief was slick enough to leave no visible marks was not
adequate insurance product).
61. Canons of construction, although criticized with some frequency, are well established as tools
for interpretation of contracts and statutes. The canons tend to divide into canons of word meaning (e.g.,
absent special circumstances, words are to be given the meaning attached by laypersons rather than
specialists; each term in a contract should be given meaning and not treated as redundant of other terms
in the contract document) and substantive canons (e.g., contracts should be construed insofar as possible
to comply with the law). See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION ch. 6 and Appendix B (6th ed. 2020) (dividing canons according to “textual” and
“substantive” canons). For a compilation of canons (which are often apply to contracts and statutes), see
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, ch. II (2012) (applying categories of “semantic” canons, “syntactic”
canons, “contextual” canons, “expected-meaning” canons, “government-structuring” canons, “privateright” canons and “stabilizing” canons); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra, at 581-89, 595-597, Appendix B, Edwin
Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 852-55 (1964)
(identifying ten well-established canons of contract interpretation). For criticisms of canons generally or
of particular canons, see ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra, at 426-442; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation
– In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 806-07 (1983); Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 396, 401-06 (1950) (classic article juxtaposing contradictory but equally
accepted canons of construction). For defense of canons, see SCALIA & GARNER, supra, note 7.
For an empirical examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of canons that buttresses our
view that textualism can be at least as malleable and result-oriented as consideration of non-textual factors,
see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral
Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 53-69 (2005) (finding that Justices vary in reliance on canons as
contrasted with legislative history and that “canon usage by justices identified as liberals tends to be linked
to liberal outcomes, and canon reliance by conservative justices to be associated with conservative
outcomes.”). Accord, James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117 (2008) (finding
ideological differences in rulings of liberal and conservative Justices associated with differential use of
canons).
62. These doctrines are not favored in that when invoked to countermand a clear agreement (or,
more specifically, purportedly clear text in a document memorializing the agreement), they are perceived
as countermanding the “bargain” struck by the parties. Nonetheless, these doctrines have substantial
support in mainstream contract law, particularly when used sparingly and judiciously. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONTRACTS, supra note 4, §§ 178-196; PERILLO, supra note 2, § 3.7(e); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 2, ch. 5.
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the trial process to resolve disputed issues of fact.63

No single component of the Integrative Approach is novel. In fact, each
pays homage to the law of many states, most predominantly to California
law,64 the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,65 and the pre-2018 drafts of
the RLLI. The Integrative Approach is not merely an academic exercise
but a methodology that should be used by lawyers, insurers, and courts. It
is an answer to the trappings of textualism that will produce more reliable
and just coverage determinations than alternative interpretive approaches,
in particular pure textualism. Its use will reduce the incidence of litigation
in the medium to long run. Over time, the Integrative Approach will
reduce the conflicting discrepancies that plague insurance coverage
jurisprudence and propel unnecessary litigation.
The Integrative Approach can accomplish these objectives using
currently established interpretive tools anchored by a purposive initial
inquiry which simply “peeks” at extra-contractual indicia as a guiding
hand. Indeed, much of the evidence courts consider does not even run
afoul of the parol evidence rule or constitute remotely novel categories of
extrinsic evidence.
III. THE DISTORTION OF THE TEXTUALIST MIRAGE
Several rationales are advanced in support of textualism. However, all
of these rationales are wanting, deceptive, or incorrect. One rationale, like
the rationale for the statute of frauds, is that focusing on text is more likely
to result in accurate contract determinations. Like textualism, this
rationale falls short conceptually by treating the text of a memorialized
agreement as the agreement itself. As stated by a leading contracts
63. Because contract construction is a “matter of law,” courts tend to seek to decide contract
construction cases on motion so long as there are not factual disputes about the content of the contract
document (e.g., assertion of scrivener’s error, missing endorsement, fraud, mutual mistake). Although
this is fine in apt cases, overly textualist courts may be unduly resistant to recognizing that a full
consideration of interpretative factors suggests the need for fact finding and determination, whether by
jury or bench trial. In apt cases, this is not a derogation of the prevailing rule that contract meaning is a
matter of law but merely a realistic recognition that in some cases, the meaning and legal consequences
of a transaction can only be assessed with the benefit of a fuller understanding of facts.
64. And especially Thomas Drayage and its progeny, discussed at TAN 20-36, supra.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS, supra note 4, §§ 200-229 (setting forth approach to
contract interpretation). The Integrative Approach also shares substantial kinship with more
comprehensive approaches to statutory constructions urged by prominent legislation and legal process
scholars. See, e.g., HENRY HART JR. & ALBERT SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
(advocating approach to statutory interpretation that gives substantial consideration to purpose underlying
statute and policies sought to be advanced as well as to the text of the law); William N. Eskridge Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990)
(advocating multi-faceted approach to construction of statutes that considers precedent, legislative history,
statutory purpose, developments since enactment, and public values and norms as well as statutory text).
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casebook:
[T]he piece of paper is not a “contract.” . . . At most, the piece of paper is
a memorialization of the contract . . . [A] contract is a promise or set of
promises that the law will enforce.
*

*

*

[T]here is a tendency to confuse the written paper signed by the parties
with the contract that binds them. It is an easy mistake to make; everyone
calls the signed paper “the contract.” But that paper is, at best, only
evidence of the contract. That is, the contract is represented by that paper;
it is not that paper. Otherwise, if you tore the paper up (or spilled coffee
on it) you would also tear up or water down the parties’ obligations. While
this may be the case with some types of obligations (such as checks or other
negotiable instruments,), that is not the case with regular, everyday
contracts.
Where do we find the promises collectively recognized as the contract?
There are many sources. The most important, but not exclusive, source of
contract terms is the words of the parties, be they written words or oral
words.66

This is the conceptually correct characterization. The contract is not
the text on paper, it is the deal, transaction, or objective memorialized on
paper.67 Parties can easily make a ”scrivener’s error” and incorrectly
memorialize an agreement.68 In such cases, strict textualism barring
consideration of extrinsic evidence is ludicrous. Contract law avoids this
in part through doctrine permitting “reformation” of the memorialization
(erroneously characterized as reformation of “the contract”)69 or the
66. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CASES AND MATERIALS
CONTRACTS: MAKING AND DOING DEALS 12, 483-84 (4th ed. 2014). We find this characterization
additionally weighty not because it is the casebook used in author Stempel’s Contracts class but because
the authors are not only prominent scholars and teachers but have substantial real world experience as law
school deans, consultants, and expert witnesses and as a federal bankruptcy judge.
67. To those who say that the writing (and not the agreement or undertaking) is the important
thing, we say: “Fine. But then why not jettison the contract model altogether and treat insurance policies
entirely as products subject to minimum standards of product quality with an implied warranty of
merchantability and express or implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose (e.g., general liability
coverage, auto coverage). Such an approach would be conceptually cleaner than fussing over fine print
and probably would not unduly favor either policyholders or insurers. See Stempel, The Insurance Policy
as Thing, supra note 53. But the same traditionalists who advocate word worship are unlikely to be willing
to depart from the contract model.
68. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 7.5; PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 9.31-9.35.
69. See FARNSWORTH supra note 4, § 7.5; PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 9.31-9.35. See, e.g., Bd. of
Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. 969 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1992) (based on evidence of party
intent, court reforms insurance policy with language court read as providing for $5 million per occurrence
policy limits for annual period and four-month “stub” period into one providing $5 million limit for year
and separate $5 million limit for occurrences taking place during stub period).
ON
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“absurd result” canon of construction.70 The corrective power of these
doctrines is limited in the hands of a raging textualist judge, particularly
one aggressively invoking the parol evidence rule.71 If the written
memorialization is clear but inaccurate, it controls, which is silly. Such
blind textualism elevates an erroneous writing above the actual agreement
or transaction.72 The objective of contract law is to enforce the promises
actually made, not to enforce promises never made or different than made
but contained in a writing. By definition, a contract is the agreement
made, not the memorialization of the agreement.73 But one might not
understand this from reading the court opinions, which routinely refer to
the memorialization as “the contract” without any distinction between
agreement and written memorialization of the agreement.
When an agreement does not result from full-throated bargaining and
relies on a standardized form, as is the case with most consumer contracts
and insurance policies, one can argue that what takes place is not so much
an agreement confirmed by a writing but the purchase of contractual
rights, with adherence to the terms of the form. In these cases, the idea of
“the contract” as text on paper may be more accurate. Contracts involving
an insurance policy, a lease, cellphone service, or a credit card account
are often fait accompli contracts where the document is not so much a
memorialization but a declaration of respective rights and duties. In such
cases, viewing the insurance policy as a consumer good or a factor sold

70. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §§ 7.10; PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 3.10-3.13. See, e.g.,
ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87407 *28 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020)
(acknowledging absurd result principle but finding it inapplicable to insurer’s challenge to arbitration
award in favor of policyholder); Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 768 N.W.2d 496, 504 (N.D. 2009) (applying
absurd result principle to reject proffered construction of gas lease); Reno Club v. Young Inv. Co., 182
P.2d 1011 (Nev. 1947) (contracts should not be construed so as to lead to an absurd result). See also
TIBCO Software, Inc. v. Thrive Revenue Sys., LLC, 2019 Del. Super. LEXIS 595 *15-16 (Del. Super.
Ct., Nov. 21, 2019) (defining absurd result as “one that no reasonable person would have accepted when
entering the contract”).
71. See FARNSWORTH supra note 4, §§ 7.2-7.6; PERILLO, supra note 4, ch.3 at 119-21.
Properly understood, the parol evidence rule should not be a barrier to just results in which the
contract is given a meaning consistent with that intended, the purpose of the transaction, or the goals and
role of the transaction in the larger commercial or consumer context. The proper view of the parol
evidence rule is that it precludes consideration of prior agreements to vary the language of the contract
document memorializing the actual, final agreement of the parties – provided the contract document is
really the final agreement of the parties and was intended to be a fully integrated instrument containing
all of the terms and conditions of the agreement. Consequently, background information regarding the
parties, their relationship, the purpose of the transaction, the industry in question, and other contextual
factors should not be barred by the parole evidence rule. See FARNSWORTH supra note 2, § 7.3; PERILLO,
supra note 2, at §§ 3.2-3.4; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS, supra note 4 § 213.
72. We continue to frequently use the term “agreement or transaction” because in many cases, a
party contracts without really “agreeing” to any particular contract terms – and may even dislike the terms
of the written document – but is voluntarily engaging in the transaction memorialized in the written
contract documents.
73. See note 67, supra.
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to a business makes more sense than continuing to cleave to the contract
model.
But the product-like traits of an insurance policy does not make myopic
examination of text (rather than a broader, more contextual approach) any
more just. It does, however, support utilization of a strong form of the
reasonable expectations approach or judicial willingness to assess
contract meaning by noting the similarity of contracts to products, private
legislation, or the activities of a regulated industry. This is particularly
the case with insurance. But despite these considerations, courts continue
to embrace a narrow textualism while failing to utilize these other
conduits of meaning.
If the written “contract document” (a technically more accurate term
than “contract”) is one where most of the contents were never discussed
by the parties, it would seem more apt to treat such transactions like the
sale of a product or give preference to the objectively reasonable
expectations of the parties when construing such instruments. However,
the same courts that cling so tenaciously to the inaccurate textual model
are resistant to the more representative product and reasonable
expectations models.
The accuracy justification for textualism is more of an anti-fraud
justification, positing that consideration of information other than the text
of the contract document opens the door to fabrication and deception as
well as more benign error. The argument is that memories fade or become
distorted. Therefore, a court should rely on text alone to the extent
possible rather than extrinsic evidence of intent or purpose. Related is the
argument that an unscrupulous or opportunistic party, or one with buyer’s
remorse, may simply fabricate a side agreement or understanding not
found in the text of the instrument.74
Though these arguments are not meritless, they are not persuasive—
particularly so 400 years after the statute of frauds was enacted in
England75 and 150 years after the parol evidence rule took root in the
United States.76 Prior to the mid-twentieth century, sources of recollection
and verification were limited. However, since the development of
photocopies, phone and wire records, and electronic data, the quantity of
memorialized extrinsic evidence has exploded. This explosion serves as
a check on faulty memory and forgetfulness and makes fabrication much
harder. This type of recorded information provides a more accurate
depiction of the intent, purpose, and function of the contract than merely
the contract itself.
Further, the purported accuracy rationale for strict textualism rests on
74. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at § 7.2; PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 3.1, 3.2.
75. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 6.1; PERILLO, supra note 4, at 677-81.
76. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at § 7.2; PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 3.1, 3.11-3.14.
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a shaky premise of institutional competence. The rationale posits that
judges are exceedingly skilled at construing language but suspect in their
ability to assess information regarding the background, intent, purpose,
and context of an agreement. As one scholar put it, “judges are not
investigative reporters.”77 Justice William Brennan similarly asserted the
historical prong of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial analysis
should be retired because judges were not trained historians.78
But these criticisms of judicial competence regarding investigation and
historical analysis fail to appreciate that judges are neither linguists nor
trained in hermeneutics. While judges may have had competent English
teachers in high school, discovered Strunk & White79 during college or
law school, and subscribe to Bryan Garner’s “word of the day” emails,80
they typically lack training in word meaning or language use.81 Judges
also commonly lack formal training in psychology beyond the
introductory courses of undergraduate days.82
Despite all their perceived deficiencies, judges make inferences about
what contract draftspersons, legislative staff, and ISO83 personnel are
thinking when selecting policy language and drafting contracts and
statutes. The canons of construction—at least those regarding word
meaning—implicitly adopt an external view of the intent behind certain
language.84 These assumptions may be totally inaccurate if the drafting
is done by someone with a different educational, vocational, or
professional background.85 The assumptions may have been inaccurate
77. Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 239 (1986) (“Judges interpret statutes; they are not
investigative reporters. The idea that Congress passes statues “with a wink,” and that courts should dig
behind the scenes to find out the “real story,” is both unwarranted and dangerous.”).
78. Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 533 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring).
79. WILLIAM STRUNK & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (4th ed. 1999).
80. University of Texas law professor and linguistic entrepreneur Bryan Garner issues daily
emails addressing questions of word meaning and language use. See, e.g., Bryan Garner’s Usage Tip:
launch (April 20, 2018), available at www.lawprose.org.
81. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993); Jill C. Anderson, Misreading
Like a Lawyer, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (2014); Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics, The Lost Readings of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992 (2008).
82. See JEAN STERNLIGHT & JENNIFER ROBBENOLT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS (2012).
83. ISO is the Insurance Services Office, an organization supporting the insurance industry
through data collection and promulgation of insurance forms and endorsements for property and casualty
insurers.
84. See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 61, Appendix B, (identifying canons of word meaning and
canons reflecting substantive policy).
85. Although it may be a useful legal fiction to assume that every insurance policy or other
contract document is written by people who received the same English grammar instruction and reacted
to it in the same way, this is unrealistic to the point of absurdity. Some drafters were drilled with
traditional rules and diagrammed sentences. Others attended open schools where rules of grammar (and
perhaps rules generally) were not emphasized. And drafters vary in terms of whether they adhere to rules
or rebel against them. If George Bernard Shaw or James Joyce writes the statute, one might take a different
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even as applied to the educated professionals viewed as the typical
drafters of contracts or statutes.
In short, although judges may be more sophisticated than the average
person, they are not experts in hermeneutics. The same may be said about
a judge’s knowledge of politics, sociology, economics, statistics,
business, or other industries involved in the cases, contracts, and statutes
before judges. And yet the picture painted by textualists is that judges are
masters in deciphering language but clueless about the history,
psychology, sociology, public policy, or nature of the transactions
involved in the statutes and contracts before the courts.86
Poppycock. The average judge is likely to understand manufacturing,
retailing, sports, entertainment, investment, or construction at least as
well as she understands the linguistic meaning of the text used in contract
documents involving these activities. Further, in the American adversary
system, one can reasonably expect that counsel for the litigants will
provide ample contextual information to the court, just as advocates
provide information and argument as to word meaning. There is no
reason to think that judges are more accurate at reading text than
understanding the extrinsic evidence of a dispute. The textualist narrative

approach to its text than if it is written by a career bureaucrat.
Further, cheap shots at bureaucracy aside, there may be specific protocols governing particular
drafters. For example, in the recently infamous “Oxford comma” case, the court was aware that the State
of Maine’s drafting manual for staff followed a style in which there was not a final (“serial” or “English”
or “Oxford”) comma before the conjunction and final term in a series of terms. In spite of this, the court
took a highly textualist approach and regarded the absence of the comma as significant enough to combine
rather than separate two categories in a list. See O’Connor v. Oakhurst Dairy, 851 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2017).
The court’s hyper-textual focus appears to be clearly at odds with the intended purpose and operation of
the statute, which was amended to constructively overrule the Oakhurst Dairy result.
86. Economics has been the most successful extra-textual discipline to impact adjudication. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2011); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW &
ECONOMICS (5th ed. 2008). But even here, the impact is largely tacit rather than expressly based on
economic analysis. But see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (Court
finds predatory pricing so unlikely as a matter of economic theory that it insists on direct evidence of
conspiracy if summary judgment is to be avoided. As much as we advocate judicial consideration of
material other than documentary text, we acknowledge that Matsushita’s excessively credulous embrace
of a particular brand of economic theory as a matter of law may make a strong case for limiting judicial
resort to social science theory. See Michael J. Kaufman, Summary Pre-Judgment: The Supreme Court’s
Profound, Pervasive, and Problematic Presumption about Human Behavior, 43 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 592
(2012)) (withering criticism of Matsushita, attributing considerable ensuing doctrinal damage from the
decision); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988) (criticizing
Matsushita but viewing its impact as more limited and isolated).
Our response is simply to note that mistakes will be made when pursuing even the most
valuable of methodologies. A court taking the integrative and comprehensive approach to contract
meaning can still make mistakes. We believe, however, that over sufficient time with a sufficiently large
number of cases, courts will render better interpretative opinions if they regularly consider a broad range
of interpretative factors in addition to text.
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posits that judges have the linguistic skill of Harold Bloom 87 but process
contextual evidence about as well as a fourth grader.
Another frequently advanced rationale for textualism is that a focus on
text constrains courts from rendering decisions based on personal policy
preferences.88 However, this rationale incorrectly assumes that neutral
readers of the text of a contract document can readily agree on its
meaning. It assumes a false clarity of language that has been refuted by
research and ignores the well-established vulnerability of humans to false
consensus bias—the view that others interpret a writing the same way as
the reader—when, in actuality, there is often substantial variance and
difference of opinion.89 Though this trait may be reduced or even
controlled in the deliberative setting of appellate review, a single trial
judge’s reading of a contract document is highly vulnerable to this trait.
Fewer than half of a trial judge’s dispositive decisions are appealed,90
which likely stems from the high cost of appeal at least as much as any
substantive acceptance of the trial judge’s rulings.91
Also, the view that text constrains the results-oriented “activist” judge
suffers from both a lack of clarity as to what constitutes impermissible
result-orientation and naivety as to the potential for a result-oriented judge
to flourish under a text-centric system. The judge wishing to advance
personal policy preferences without regard to what the parties actually
intended can easily do so by advancing an interpretation of text designed
to achieve that result. By contrast, forcing this same result-oriented judge
to address the context of the contract does more to restrain such a judge.
A third rationale posits that confining the judicial inquiry92 to text
87. Harold Bloom, Sterling Professor of Humanities at Yale University, is considered a leading
scholar of literature and literary critic who is perhaps best known to the general public for THE WESTERN
CANON: THE BOOKS AND SCHOOL OF THE AGES (1994) and THE BOOK OF J (2004). See also HOW TO
READ AND WHY (2000). See James Shapiro, The Soul of the Age, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 1998),
https://perma.cc/6PVW-MFKF (Bloom is “one of the most gifted of contemporary critics”).
88. See e.g., Paul Killebrew, Note, Where Are All the Left-Wing Textualists?, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1895, 1918 (2007) (“By making judges stick to statutory text and refrain from making unbounded
inquiries into legislative intent, textualism gives judges fewer materials on which to base interpretations
chosen primarily because they further the judges' own preferred outcomes.”).
89. See Lawrence Solan, False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM L. REV.
1268 (2008).
90. See Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further
Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Outcomes, 1 J. EMP. LEG. STUDIES 659 (2004) (appeals filed in only 10-20
percent of cases, with appeal rate of less than 40 percent in cases with full trial).
91. See
Donna
Bader,
An
Appeal
to
Reason
(2011),
advertised
at
https://www.anappealtoreason.com/faq (cost of appeal ranges from $20,000 to $50,000); Sylvia H.
Walbolt, The Art of Evaluating an Appeal: 10 Hard-Learned Tips, Carlton Fields (Aug. 23, 2016),
https://www.carletonfields.com (prominent appellate lawyer notes that although appeals can be effective
in changing adverse result or providing settlement leverage, they are also often costly and appellant is at
a disadvantage in challenging trial court result).
92. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
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conserves judicial resources and enhances judicial efficiency. This
rationale appears the most accurate of the three. Logically, at least, it
seems that a court can resolve contract disputes faster if it is required only
to read and interpret text rather than to consider extrinsic evidence that
emerges only after the court has presided over the resolution of discovery
disputes.
But this argument overstates the time savings of a relentlessly textual
approach. Unless obviously clear and apt for the circumstances, some
nontrivial judicial resources will be required to read, understand, and
reflect upon the language of statutes and contract documents and assess
the arguments of counsel. By looking at text alone and purporting to
understand it, the court will be tempted to resolve the interpretative
dispute as a matter of law via a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment. This approach likely leads to appeal and reversal more
frequently than a summary judgment decision as to meaning supported by
extrinsic evidence. To the extent that extrinsic evidence shows a genuine
issue of material fact precluding summary judgment, the case marches
toward trial, probably to be settled without the expenditure of
substantially more judicial resources.
In short, textualism does not save courts much time. Any time saved
is likely at the cost of accuracy and justice. If judicial decisions as to the
meaning of a writing are made with the benefit of additional information
regarding meaning, those decisions are likely to be more accurate than
decisions based on text alone. Even if this accuracy comes at significant
administrative cost, it is a trade-off worth making. Reduced accuracy of
contract construction decisions resulting from the rigid application of
textualism should be acceptable only if limiting the inquiry to text saves
vast amounts of judicial and legal resources. However, there is
insufficient evidence of such efficiency to justify use of the limited,
contextually impoverished inquiry of textualism, rather than the richer
examination of the Integrative Approach.
A fourth rationale for textualism posits that it is an interpretative
approach better suited to the limited authority of courts. The argument
runs something like this: courts should avoid intruding on the other
branches of government and agreements of private parties; when asked to
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 36 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("The most immediate and tangible change
the abandonment of legislative history would effect is this: Judges, lawyers, and clients will be saved an
enormous amount of time and expense.").; James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from
Judges Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L. J. 1, 83 (1994) ("At bottom, one practical
advantage of textualism is its comparative ease of application with little investment of judicial and litigant
resources. Cases can be decided without extensive investigation of legislative histories or discussion of
competing policy implications, tasks judges and litigants in the lower courts may find difficult to
undertake."). Even strong supporters of textualism concede that this cannot be done in each case because
of ambiguity of text. We are not trying to cartoon textualism.
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construe a statute or contract, courts should limit their activity to classic
judicial activity, such as reading and construing contract text, and avoid
activity that could be construed as “rewriting” a contract or “legislating
from the bench.”93
This argument and rationale rests on an infirm foundation. Although
courts lack legislative and executive policymaking authority, legal rulings
ultimately have policy implications. Even in the private law realm of
contract, it has long been accepted that courts will not enforce illegal
contracts, contracts made by minors, unconscionable contracts, or
contracts that violate public policy. Thus, there is nothing “wrong” with
courts making decisions based on public policy factors.
More importantly, like the adjudication of negligence claims, the
resolution of contract disputes is a core judicial function. Contract dispute
resolution by reference to material other than the text of contract
documents does not offend other branches of government. In the realm
of statutory interpretation, consideration of legislative history, executive
orders, and presidential signing statements, there is more judicial
deference to the coordinate branches than reliance on statutory text alone.
The “judicial restraint” argument of strict textualism is just as weak as the
other rationales discussed.
IV. COURTS AS HELPFUL AGENTS RATHER THAN LIMITED UMPIRES
The umpire metaphor of judging has a dominant place in American
thinking about the judicial process, as perhaps most famously illustrated
through its use by Chief Justice John Roberts to support his nomination.
Justice Roberts successfully allayed concerns that his apparent history of
conservative ideology and past political activity was inconsistent with the
judiciary as comprised of judges functioning as mere neutral umpires who
simply “call balls and strikes” without partisanship.94 Although several
commentators, correctly in our view, including Judge Richard Posner,
pointed out flaws in the metaphor,95 it resonated well with the lay public
93. See sources cited in note 88, supra (arguing that textualism curbs judicial activism).
94. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief J. of the United States) (“Judges
are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is
critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball
game to see the umpire.”); MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS
COURT ix (2013) (noting success of Roberts umpire metaphor but finding it to mask Court with active
conservative agenda). And Justice Roberts was hardly the first to invoke the umpire metaphor, although
he may be the poster child of its success. See Symposium, Alternative Visions of the Judicial Role 32
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 511(2009).
95. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 78 (2010) (criticizing umpire metaphor as both
simplistic and affirmatively misleading).
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and the body politic.96
To the extent that the umpire metaphor simply stands for the
proposition that judges should not be biased for or prejudiced against the
individual litigants or those clearly impacted by a decision, we have no
quarrel with it. An umpire who takes a bribe, bets against the point spread,
or even secretly has favorites or roots for one team is not a proper
adjudicator. But even if not personally invested in the game, umpires
differ regarding their views of the strike zone, reasonable time to allow a
pitcher’s set-up, out and safe calls at first base, what constitutes
interference with a base runner, and the like.
Differential exercise of discretion abounds not only in the umpire
analogy but throughout officiating. A football referee could call holding,
illegal use of the hands or pass interference on nearly every play but does
not. Basketball referees vary in the amount of body contact permitted
under the basket, but “calling it close” could turn a game into a constant
parade between the foul lines. Hockey officials display discretion in
determining when a scrum for the puck in the corner becomes a boarding
or cross-checking penalty. Just as some officials are known to call it close
while others “let them play,” judges vary in their approach to text.
To determine the relative merits of a strictly textual approach versus a
broader approach to contract and statutory construction, one question to
ask is whether strict textualism leads to more or less variance of
interpretation compared to when judges consider text along with other
indicia of meaning. More important still is the question of whether
construction confined to text gives more or less accurate assessments than
a broader approach. Also obviously important is the question of whether
decisions rendered pursuant to a strictly textual examination yield more
just outcomes than decisions made using a broader approach.97
Like the umpire analogy, a focus on text or even text alone is thought
to constrain the judge from interjecting the court’s own opinions, based
on the view that language is almost always clear and can only be stretched
so far when the interpreter is both confined to text and also unable to
consider information beyond the text.98 But this view is incorrect and not
only ignores the great flexibility interpreters have regarding reading of
text (similar to that of umpires and other officials) but also unduly
96. John Roberts was confirmed as Chief Justice by a 78-22 vote on September 29, 2005. His
performance at his confirmation hearings was generally praised in the media. See Charles Babington &
Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2005),
https://perma.cc/7ANM-EHTN (Roberts “drew rave reviews from many senators for his encyclopedic
knowledge of constitutional law and his smooth answers during two days of Senate hearings”).
97. Although some may view this inquiry as less important of a view that courts are primarily
dispute resolvers and only secondarily articulators of norms.
98. See sources cited in note 88, supra (supporting textualism as cabining judicial discretion/more
consistent with judicial role).
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minimizes the constraints adjudicators face when viewing information
extrinsic to text.
Particularly important, and seemingly overlooked by advocates of the
traditional umpire analogy, is the degree to which officiating discretion is
exercised not in a textualist vacuum, such as what “the rule” says, but in
a contextual manner. The “rule” contained in the text of the rulebook is
that basketball is a non-contact sport, but in the area near the basket,
players are always jostling for position, just as they are constantly setting
screens. Referees may or may not let roughhousing go without penalty
depending not only on the extremity but also the effect of the conduct.
Pushing or grabbing the opponent when play is at the other end of the
floor goes uncalled, while the same conduct when the opponent is
attempting to receive a pass or tap in a rebound results in a foul call. A
slap on the shooter’s forearm when launching a shot is called a foul in the
middle of the second half in a close game. It goes uncalled in the last
minute of a blowout.
Sports referees, like laypersons, instinctively use a broad, contextual
approach to interpretation of text and application of rules. And insofar as
we have been able to discover, nothing is said about this in the text of the
rulebooks.99 It is part of the “common sense” that law is supposed to
celebrate but that somehow has been shunted aside by textual
fundamentalists. The judiciary should openly harness the same common
sense in matters of interpretation and formally disavow the excessively
textualist interpretation. Courts already do this to a large extent even when
purporting to be confined to the text of a contract document.100
99. For example, the 66-page Rulebook of the National Basketball Association says nothing about
whether officials are supposed to enforce the rules formally or functionally and says nothing about the
degree of discretion, if any, official have in applying the Rules. See NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, OFFICIAL
RULES OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION (2016) (the most updated version of the Rulebook
is available at https://official.nba.com); NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, NBA CASE BOOK 20162017: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS TO NBA RULES (2016) (setting forth many hypothetical situations and
providing model answers as to characterization as foul and enforcement).
One could read the Rules in isolation and conclude that officials should call every single
violation seen, no matter how slight. However, Section IV (“Decisions by Different Officials,” dealing
with conferences regarding different views of a foul or out-of-bounds call) and Section V (“Time and
Place for Decisions,” setting forth protocol for communicating decisions and allowing officials to
“suspend play for any unusual circumstance” suggests some level of discretion for the official. Referees
are implicitly authorized to use their discretion, but the scope of the discretion and its application are part
of the context and “common law” of the League.
The rulebooks of other major sports are similarly vague as to how official should apply the
Rules. See, e.g., NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE OFFICIAL RULES 20172018 (2017), http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/rules/2017-2018-NHL-rulebook.pdf (no discussion of
referee discretion or protocols of enforcement), NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 2017 OFFICIAL PLAYING
RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (2017), https://operations.nfl.com/media/2646/2017playing-rules.pdf (most updated version available at nfl.com).
100. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 51, § 3 cmt. b (noting
that even courts embracing a strict plain-meaning textual approach often do look outside the insurance
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We are not advocating total eradication of the umpire metaphor.
Notwithstanding its flaws, it captures more than a kernel of the judicial
role. Similarly, consideration of text is, of course, a core element of the
interpretative role of the judiciary. However, just as the umpire metaphor
should not be simplistically and inflexibly imposed on the nuanced
activity of adjudication, the courts should similarly not view text only in
isolation. At a minimum, courts should not be overly literal when reading
text.
Rather than worrying about limitations on judicial role and the dangers
of interpretation that enlists material other than documentary text, courts
would be more helpful to disputants, the judicial system, the economy,
society, and the business of insurance, if they openly embraced the role
of helpful arbiters of disputes willing to examine all potential indicators
of meaning.
The judicial role should be one of seeking to determine the actual
meaning of a disputed term in light of all relevant factors, in a manner
that vindicates the intent of the parties, the purpose of the contract, the
function of the transaction, and where not inconsistent with these other
factors, public policy. In short, courts should worry less about the precise
meaning of textual memorialization of a transaction and worry more
about giving contract document text a construction that fairly resolves the
dispute.
The Integrative Approach is perhaps both radical and pedestrian. It is
radical in that it challenges, or perhaps rejects altogether, conventional
wisdoms regarding the supposedly constrained umpire role and the clarity
and constraining power of text. But it is pedestrian in that many courts
already take something akin to the Integrative Approach. However,
courts that take the Integrative Approach often do so under cover of
distinctly unhelpful textualist rhetoric.
The Integrative Approach, at the risk of being pedestrian, simply
implores courts to be helpful and useful, to lend a hand in the purposive
enterprise of accomplishing a transaction, rather than acting as formalist
gatekeepers who deny purchased contract benefits or award windfalls
based on a reading of words in isolation. Courts should also obviously
attempt to be helpful to private parties and other governmental actors.
And most judges, even the most formalist or textualist, would
undoubtedly argue that this is what they do, justifying their judicial
philosophy in terms similar to the rationales used to support rigid

policy for evidence of meaning, examining dictionaries, decisions from other courts, and secondary legal
authority that provides information about the history and context of insurance-policy forms and insurance
practices.).
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application of the statute of limitations,101 res judicata,102 an arbitration
provision included with the packing material of a computer,103 a definition
of protected species,104 calculation of statutory compensation,105 or
refusal to uphold a seeming agreement because it is not sufficiently
specific on the face of the contract documents.106 In the insurance context,
this judicial textual formalism is reflected in cases giving strict
application to a policy’s text, such as imposing strict deadlines for giving
notice, submitting claims, defining causation, and the like.107
To this segment of the bench, being helpful means rigidly applying the
rules and what is seen as the clear meaning of text. There is ample judicial
rhetoric supporting their textual literalism. Ironically, however, even as
textualist rhetoric abounds, some of the most revered judges are those
101. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, (1985) (giving literal and strict enforcement to
provision requiring renewal of lease “before December 31” under circumstances strongly suggesting
language resulting from scrivener’s error and that intent was to state “on or before December 31,” resulting
in forfeiture of rights).
102. See, e.g. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (talking strict view of claim
preclusion/res judicata).
103. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), (arbitration clause contained
in package slip inside box of delivered computer is enforceable and accepted by purchaser’s continued
use of computer after unpacking even though arbitration was never discussed as part of the sale); M.A.
Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (same approach enforcing
arbitration clause in software disk “shrinkwrap”). Accord, Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Telegraph Co., 701
F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2012) (applying Florida and Oklahoma law) (enforcing forum selection provisions
contained in “clickwrap” to which customer ostensibly assents via internet; reviewing caselaw generally
enforcing such provisions in accord with their text). Further reflecting the perils of textualism the Hill v.
Gateway reading of the text of the package “terms in a box” is regarded by many as incorrect. See, e.g.,
Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, n. 9 (D. Kan. 2000) (subsequently vacated for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction) (noting scholarly criticism of Hill v. Gateway analysis and rejecting it in favor of view
that arbitration agreement was not made simply because portion of contract shipping documents contained
arbitration clause).
104. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (construing Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C. 1531 to protect the snail darter and preclude operation of dam that would disturb its last remaining
natural habitat).
105. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982) (taking literal view of
Jones Act remedies provision to provide plaintiff seaman with double wages for each day payment of
“full” wage was delayed, 46 U.S.C. § 4529, resulting in $302,000 award where defendant had wrongfully
retained $412.50 of wages from period of January 1, 1976, when plaintiff was injured until time of trial
years later). To be fair to Justice Rehnquist and the Griffin majority, they did consider legislative history,
including amendments to the statute, that was enacted in 1790. But see 458 U.S. at 577 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (taking issue with majority’s reading of legislative history as well as strict textualism).
106. See, e.g., Walker v. Keith, 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964) (finding lease term too indefinite
because a specific option price for renewal not stated; court unwilling to determine reasonable price by
reference to custom, practice, or other extrinsic or contextual information).
107. See, e.g., Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Acker-Fitzsimons Sec. Corp., 293 N.E.2d 76 (N.Y. 1972)
(giving strict enforcement of requirement that notice be timely even in the absence of any showing of
prejudice to the insurer); Kirk v. Fin. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 389 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 1978) (enforcing provision
requiring that limb be amputated within 90 days to be considered caused by accident and eligible for
enhanced benefits.). More recently, see Keyspan Gas E. Corp. v. Munich Reins. Am., Inc., 96 N.E.3d
209 (N.Y. 2018) (requiring pro-rata allocation of coverage responsibility across years during which injury
took place even if policyholder was unable to obtain insurance during certain years).
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rejecting literalism.108 As compared to the prevailing formal or textual
approaches, the role of the judge as the helpful purveyor of purposive
information, based on the consideration of multiple factors, has been
unduly overlooked because it might wrongly be labeled partisan judicial
activism and, in regard to statutory construction, out of a misplaced view
of the role of courts as a check on other branches of government.
Applied to the construction of insurance policies, the helpful judicial
role means courts not only reading policy text realistically but also
reading language in context, considering other indicia of meaning, even
when the isolated text is seemingly clear on its face. Text standing alone
can be misleading without context. Reasonable readers may derive quite
different meanings from the same text. Further, text is only the contract
document and not the contract. The court’s preferred reading of text
should always be weighed against these other considerations. The judicial
role should not be to serve as a grammar arbiter or literary critic but to
decide disputes of interpretation as accurately as feasible based on
available information.
Although advocating any deviation from textualism seems to draw
criticism, the Integrative Approach should also be unobjectionable in that
it will probably not alter the results obtained by textualism in many,
perhaps most, cases. A judge’s interpretation of the text will usually be
vindicated rather than changed by examination of other interpretative
factors. Although text is imperfect and textualism opens itself to
manipulation far more than its defenders admit, we acknowledge that
most contract documents accurately reflect the understanding of the
parties and aim of the transaction at issue.
This raises the question of whether the additional time considering
extrinsic evidence is worth the effort. To us, the clear answer is “yes.”
Achieving optimal, accurate, and just construction of text is worth the
extra effort and cost, unless the cost is shown to be sufficiently high to
imperil other goals of the adjudicatory system.
Proponents of textualism can undoubtedly trot out testimonials—
perhaps even from judges themselves—about the burdens and costs of
processing extrinsic evidence. But this is insufficient support for
textualism, particularly where the testimonials are anecdotal rather than
based on a sufficiently large empirical examination of whether textualism
actually achieves its purported benefits.
108. See, e.g., Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921) (Judge Benjamin Cardozo
rejects view that specification of a particular brand of pipe must be literally enforced so as to require
replacing plumbing system in custom-build home); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214
(N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo implies term not on the face of written instrument to find agreement sufficiently
definite to merit enforcement). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION
(1990) (noting great esteem in which Cardozo is held by lawyers and attributing much of it to his
pragmatist approach to deciding cases, which considered a range of contextual factors).
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The incremental cost of considering the relatively small relevant
amount of extrinsic contextual information surrounding a written
instrument is not particularly large when added to the base cost of
adjudicating the dispute in the first place. In an adversary system, the
judge does not need to engage in extensive research and sweeping
consideration of vast fields of contextual evidence to decide a dispute.
Counsel for the parties should frame both the textual and contextual
aspects of the case and develop extrinsic information relevant to the
dispute.
Absent a great imbalance of resources or incompetent counsel, the
adversary system should provide the neutral judge with a database of
information to accompany the textual term in dispute. Our view is that
this greater quantum of information will not be that expensive to
develop,109 and its consideration by courts will improve the adjudicatory
interpretative process.
Although fans of textualism, including many judges, can be expected
to complain about the burden of “sifting through” extrinsic information,
we think such protests are excessive. Unlike their civil law counterparts,
American judges are not burdened by the inquisitorial model of
developing a case. They can, thanks in part to the umpire metaphor, wait
to see what the advocates working in an adversarial system put before
them in terms of highlighted contract document text, correspondence,
meeting minutes, drafting history, custom, practice, usage in trade, course
of dealing, or expert information regarding an industry or field.
The list of considerations under our Integrative Approach looks
daunting in general but in specific cases will be much shorter according
to the facts of the dispute. Effective counsel, particularly if challenging
an opponent’s reading of documentary text to which the court may be
receptive, do not throw the proverbial kitchen sink of extrinsic
information at the judge. Rather, counsel selects the most relevant
information with which he or she hopes to persuade the court that his or
her proffered meaning is the correct construction of the disputed text.
Opposing counsel responds in kind.
If the adversary system is working as it should, the parties and counsel
have done the sifting for the court. The judge need only review this
streamlined material alongside the text and make a decision. This does
not strike us as an undue burden waiting for ‘something’ to happen; this
strikes us as likely to bring more just results than staring at the text
alone.110
109. In practice, this contextual information may be being developed and presented in the majority
of contract construction cases but simply go unnoticed because it is not openly discussed by courts
interpreting disputed text in insurance policies or other contract documents.
110. At the margin, a more comprehensive approach will result in some cases in which there is at
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V. DE-EMPHASIZING THE DICTIONARY
If strict textualism allows any sort of extrinsic evidence beyond the text
to deduce meaning of contract terms at issue, a small nudge will typically
prompt most strict textualists to permit consideration of one singular
extrinsic source of word meaning: the dictionary. The dictionary is
ubiquitous in insurance coverage interpretation disputes. For some
reason, using a dictionary to consider insurance policy word meaning is
seen as less heretic a move than considering the underwriting evidence
from the employee who drafted the insurance policy. This, to us, is a
puzzle.
While our Integrative Approach does not revolt entirely from using a
dictionary to assist in the interpretive analysis, there should be a very
limited and conscribed use for the dictionary in legal construction
instances. The dictionary is merely one indicia of possible word meaning
in a contract and one entirely unrelated to the actual drafting process.
Indeed, on the continuum of what could be “extrinsic” evidence, such
as evidence beyond the four corners of the document, the dictionary is
more “extrinsic” than a host of other extrinsic evidence, like past
performance, course of dealing, trade usage, contemporaneous notes, oral
evidence of the negotiation, or even third-party witnesses to the
negotiation. In fact, the dictionary might be about as “extrinsic” as one
can get. No insurance policy has stapled to it a standard college
dictionary—the policy does not direct one to consult a dictionary for any
additional information—yet the high church of textualism reveres the
dictionary.111
There are serious interpretive dangers to using solely a dictionary to
construe word meaning in a contractual dispute. Judge Learned Hand’s
observation about not making a “fortress out of the dictionary”112 was
least a marginal uptick in the material that must be considered by courts and hence create somewhat more
work for courts. But unless it can be shown that the extra work is unduly burdensome, it should be
regarded as worthwhile in order to achieve better results. It must also be noted, as stated in RLLI § 3,
comment a. that even courts purporting to be strictly textualist routinely do take on the burden of analyzing
“dictionaries, decisions form other courts, and secondary legal authority that provides information about
the history and context of insurance-policy forms and insurance practice.” See RLLI, supra note 42, at
18. In most cases, this takes at least as much or more time and effort as the consideration of other indicia
of meaning advocated by the Integrative Approach.
111. See Mark A. Lemley, Chief Justice Webster, 106 IOWA L. REV. 299, 299 (“The Supreme Court
has a love affair with the dictionary. Half of its decisions in the 2018 Term cited a dictionary, often as
the primary or exclusive means of defining a statutory term. The Court regularly upends decades of
precedent and ignores congressional intent (and sometimes common sense) in favor of a chosen dictionary
definition.”).
112. See Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (“It is one of the surest indexes of
a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary but to remember that
statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery
is the surest guide to their meaning.”).
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excellent advice seventy-five years ago and remains so today, albeit
unfortunately forgotten by many modern courts and commentators.113 The
fact that dictionary usage has been settled upon as some sort of
compromised middle ground for textualists is downright spooky.
It may be that looking up the meaning of a disputed word in a dictionary
is seen as a neutral, policy-free action that could not possibly taint the
purely textual inquiry into the “plain meaning” of a disputed term. It is
not. It cannot be. The dictionary, as an extra-legal text, is a resource for
something other than what it is being used for in that context. The
dictionary is not a legal treatise. It is not referred to in insurance policies.
It is a separate historical encyclopedia of past and present possible
meanings for individual words. Each entry can have many possible
meanings. Each version of the dictionary, whether Oxford or MerriamWebster, can have different meanings.114 There are many examples in
insurance law where a single term at issue can have multiple possible
meanings cited in dictionaries, some favouring a coverage result, and
others not.
Furthermore, the order in which words appear in the dictionary may
not be what the court expects. Typically, words are defined in a dictionary
from earliest use to most recent use.115 The order is not from most to least
popular use. There is also something highly problematic about parsing out
individual words in an insurance policy and looking up each word
separately from the other, devoid of any basic context, including how each
word is placed related to the other in the policy. A disambiguated meaning
of a word, or words strung together, is just that. It is an extra-legal, extracontractual descriptor of a single word. How that word operates in the
phrase it sits, or in the document, may have a profound effect on what it
means. Whether the word sits in a coverage or exclusion clause is the most
obvious example. Coverage clauses in insurance are to be construed
113. The shocking frequency of the modern Supreme Court’s dictionary use is well encapsulated
in Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More Frequently to Dictionary, and Not Just for Big Words, N.Y. TIMES
(June 13, 2011) (noting 10-fold upsurge in dictionary consultation in 21st Century Court as compared to
1960s Court and that “Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin N. Cardozo and Louis D. Brandeis
managed to make it through distinguished careers on the Supreme Court without citing dictionaries.”).
Further, “The justices cited more than 120 dictionaries, which is suggestive of cherry picking.” Id. Not
even the editor of the Oxford English Dictionary was happy about the Court’s affinity for dictionaries,
noting: “It’s easy to stack the deck by finding a definition that does or does not highlight a nuance that
you’re interested in” and “[d]ictionary definitions are written with a lot of things in mind, but rigorously
circumscribing the exact meaning and connotations of terms is not usually one of them” (comments of
Jesse Sheidlower). Id.
114. See, e.g., the varying definitions in the key words in the coverage clause for standard property
insurance: “direct physical loss of or damage to property.” Erik S. Knutsen & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Infected
Judgment: Creating Conventional Wisdom and Insurance Coverage Denial in a Pandemic, 27 CONN INS.
L.J. 185 (cataloguing the multitude of different dictionary entries for each operative word in the clause).
115. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 19 (9th ed. 1984) (the “[o]rder of senses
[in the dictionary] is historical.”).
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broadly, and exclusion clauses are to be construed narrowly. And most
important, the document’s intended function in the commercial
marketplace matters. Is it a policy for disability insurance or is it a cell
phone plan contract?
The act of choosing a definition out of a listing found in a dictionary is
not without problems either. Such a choice is subject to false consensus
bias,116 meaning one chooses the definition one wants to choose and
“thinks” it is the one everybody else will also choose.117 As D.C. Circuit
Judge Harold Leventhal apparently observed when discussing court use
of legislative history, choosing “the” definition out of a dictionary is like
“looking out over a crowd and spotting your friends.”118 But the same, of
course, is true regarding selection of a preferred dictionary definition.
Insurers, and, of course, policyholders as well, know the answer they want
and will naturally be drawn, at least subconsciously, to the definition that
best meets their needs. In addition, dictionary use may mislead through
simple happenstance when a judge, or law clerk or counsel writing a brief
that influences the judge, reaches for the dictionary on the closest shelf or
reads only the first dictionary entry resulting from a browser search.
There is something facially odd about using the dictionary to discern
word meaning in insurance policies when the goal is to understand the
“plain meaning” as understood by everyday people. People do not talk
like the dictionary. People do not think like the dictionary. In fact, the aim
of the dictionary is not to make it a catalogue of how reasonable people
would grasp a word. It is to define the word as a referent in the English
language to other words. And in many dictionary definitions, the word
being defined is included in the definition!
Why then do so many courts, when construing contractual language,
reach for the dictionary over some other form of extrinsic evidence? The
answer is simple—simplicity. Most judges have near-instant access to a
dictionary. Just looking up a word, stating “that must be the meaning,”
and moving on to some other dispute makes the job easy. It may be wrong,
but it was easy. It felt “safe.” The dictionary feels like an apolitical
reference. We happen to think blind reliance on dictionary usage is a
116. See Linda Babcock & George Lowenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of SelfServing Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 109 (1997) (describing phenomenon and its impact in
prompting disputants or negotiating parties to overvalue their own skills, conduct, and position in
transactions or litigation).
117. See Lawrence Solan, et al., supra note 89.
118. See, e.g. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (citing a conversation with Judge Leventhal),
quoted in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); Conroy v. Aniskoff,
507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (paraphrasing Leventhal ); Abner J. Mikva, Statutory
Interpretation: Getting the Law to Be Less Common, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 981–82 (1989); Adam M.
Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd – Do More Interpretive Sources Mean More Discretion?, 92 NYU L.
Rev. 554 (2017) (discussing the genealogy and meaning of the quote attributed to Judge Leventhal).
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deplorable way to administer justice. We do not roll dice to determine
damages. Why would we unflinchingly grab a text that is entirely
unrelated to the contract at issue, pick out an entry that matches a word at
issue in the contract, and say “the dictionary says this, the word means
that . . . therefore the legal result in this context must be so.” This is not
the court as a helpful agent. This is not even the court as an umpire. This
is something else entirely. Dictionaries are not written to help determine
legal disputes. Yet, American judicial practice would appear to indicate
otherwise. So, when a strict textualist approach to contract construction
breaks rank and reaches for the dictionary, such is not to be seen as a
move to a more reasonable approach. It is no less contextual. In fact, it is
probably less so because now some totally unrelated source of meaning
is inserted into the process.
A classic example of the horrors of blind dictionary usage in insurance
law comes from the infamous string of cases about theft insurance. The
definition of “theft” in the policy required “external violence” to the
lockset for coverage of theft to attach.119 The reason behind using that
phrase was to indicate that the insurer did not want to insure against inside
theft jobs where the policyholder “misplaced” its own goods and claimed
insurance proceeds. If the lock appeared smashed or otherwise tampered
with, there was easy evidence that some miscreant broke in and stole the
insured goods. However, there were many cases where a skilled lockpick
entered insured premises and pilfered valuable goods. When the
policyholder came to claim for the loss, the insurers denied coverage
because there was no evidence of “external violence” on the locksets. The
policyholder was no less robbed; it was just unlucky enough to have been
robbed by a skilled robber.
Courts frequently used dictionary definitions for the singularly
operative words “external” and “violence” to hold that, for coverage to
attach, the policy demanded there must be some physical change to the
locks that was visible outside the locks. Using a dictionary to buttress
such a textualist response only makes the result go from bad to worse.
Saying the policyholders had no coverage for theft in the context of a theft
policy, because the theft policy they bought demanded visibly physical
changes to the locks, makes theft coverage a nullity for losses from all but
the clumsiest of thieves. That surely could not be the intent of the insurer
and most certainly is not the intent of the policyholder. But holding up the
dictionary definitions of “external” and “violence” as “the” reasons for
the loss of coverage simply strikes as baffling. These are cases where the
dictionary is used to buttress an extreme version of textualism.

119. See notes 41, 60, supra and note 122, infra (discussing caselaw regarding theft insurance
requirement of visible marks of forced entry).
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So, when is a dictionary definition helpful in the inquiry into word
meaning? In our Integrative Approach to interpretation, a dictionary
definition can be helpful as one source of extrinsic evidence, not to say,
“this is the meaning” but to say, “wow, there are a lot of meanings for this
term.” Rather, a dictionary could be one source, external to the agreement,
that can indicate there may be a range of understandings of a certain term.
Sometimes meanings change over time and a dictionary can be a helpful
tool for knowing that, too. But certainly, a dictionary should never trump
those extrinsic sources of context that are closer to the agreement itself,
such as direct evidence from the drafters themselves, course of dealing,
course of performance, standard industry term usage, marketing
literature, or in the case of insurance policies, underwriting documents. In
short, a dictionary should not be treated as a representation of “how
people talk” or how reasonable people view the plain meaning of terms.
It is not the “plain meaning manual” for judges. It is a disambiguated
catalogue of historical word meanings that can be equally obtusely
worded as the other document being construed.
We think that, by following our Integrative Approach to insurance
policy interpretation, courts will fall victim far less often to the
duplicitous use of the dictionary. Using other indicia of word meaning
that gets closer to a contextual analysis of the words at issue quickly
protects courts from the dangers of incorrect dictionary usage.
VI. MAKING COURTS MORE USEFUL: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO
INTERPRETATION
A. The Philosophy of the Approach
Although the tenacity of textualism may prove too great a barrier to
change, American law and adjudication would be better off abandoning
its textual religion in favor of a more Integrative Approach. Our aspiration
is that judicial contract construction should be as useful as feasible to
commerce and society. A narrowly textualist, strict plain meaning
approach to deciding contract disputes and insurance policy construction
unduly limits the ability of courts to be helpful to the enterprise of
enforcing transactions, both consumer and commercial. It only stands to
reason that a court equipped with more intellectual tools for determining
meaning will be better able to accurately determine meaning as well as
when meaning may need to yield to considerations of public policy.
We understand the textualist argument to the contrary. It essentially
posits that consideration of anything but the words of a contract document
fail to sufficiently constrain judges from interjecting personal
preferences. For the reasons set forth above, we reject this argument.
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Words are sufficiently malleable, such that a judge wishing, either
consciously or unconsciously, to impose personal preferences upon a
decision can easily do so through the textualist approach. By contrast,
contextual factors are likely to be at least as constraining as words. One
may, for example, quarrel about whether the word “sudden” connotes an
abrupt development or merely one that is unexpected.120 It is more
difficult to argue over the meaning of sales or underwriting notes
reflecting an agreement that environmental liabilities would be covered
unless resulting from expected or intended injury.
One may, for example, argue about whether the word “suit” includes
administrative proceedings from which liability may result, which in turn
affects whether a liability insurer must defend the action.121 It is
considerably more difficult to misread underwriting documents indicating
the policy would cover administrative proceedings or the testimony of the
broker that potential administrative actions were expressly discussed and
anticipated by the parties at the time the policy was purchased.
For example, in a case where a master thief was able to pull off theft
without leaving a trace, such as picking the lock, one may take a hyperliteral approach to a burglary policy and deny coverage for “theft”
because the policy stipulates that “theft” coverage requires evidence of
“external violence to the lock.”122 Yet, a denial of coverage would be
extremely hard if not impossible to justify if one also read the
underwriting notes instead of part of the policy, which indicated that the
twin purposes of requiring evidence of “external violence to the lock” are
to corroborate that the theft was not an inside job, leaving aside, of course,
that the very point of the policy is to cover for “theft” and prompt
policyholders to reasonably secure premises.
The Integrative Approach to construing disputed insurance policy
terms and resolving insurance coverage questions presents a path to
improved insurance policy interpretation. The contract and statutory
120. See RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE:
KEY ISSUES IN EVERY STATE Ch. 14 (4th ed. 2018) (noting split in caselaw regarding qualified pollution
exclusion in operation during 1970-1986 time period, which barred pollution coverage unless the release
of the pollutant was “sudden and accidental”; STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 41, § 14.11 (same re
qualified pollution exclusion; also discussion of disputes over application of absolute pollution exclusion
that replaced the former).
121. Compare Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 959 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1998)
(notice of possible liability from environmental regulator not a “suit” within the meaning of CGL policy
duty to defend obligations) with Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990)
(finding such regulatory proceedings constitute “suit” under CGL policy).
122. See, e.g., Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National Mutual Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271
(Minn. 1985) (“burglary” defined as “[T]he felonious abstraction of insured property (1) from within the
premises by a person making felonious entry therein by actual force and violence, of which force and
violence there are visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals upon, or physical
damage to, the exterior of the premises at the place of such entry”; court held that reasonable expectations
of policyholder applied, as this policy was to cover “burglary.”).
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construction considerations listed at the outset of this Article and
discussed in this Part are of necessity presented in rough sequential order
as we see the process unfolding in the typical case. However, the order
in which courts may consider interpretative factors is not fixed, save for
the need to first appreciate the overall context and purpose of the
insurance policy in question or any non-insurance transaction at issue.
We contend it is vital to anchor the initial inquiry in that first step.
There is a kinship among the Restatement (Second) of Contract’s
contextual approach, Thomas Drayage, and the pre-2018 versions of
RLLI § 3.123 Like these approaches, the Integrative Approach does not
ignore the text of insurance policies and other contract documents.124 To
the contrary, document text remains an important marker of meaning. But
when assessed through the Integrative Approach, document text—or,
more precisely, an individual judge’s reading of the text in isolation—is
not all-powerful.
B. Application of the Approach
The court faced with a coverage dispute should obtain a rough
understanding of the context and chronology of the sale, underwriting,
and placement of the insurance policy in question. In short, what is the
objective of the document? Why does it exist and what is it supposed to
do? Who buys it and for what reasons? Then, the court should read the
term or terms in dispute considering this background information, the
policy as a whole, the type of policy at issue, the larger context of the
parties’ transaction, the actions of the parties, and the nature of the
transaction in general.
Where the insurance policy defines a term, this of course is entitled to
great weight, as it is a strong “internal” aid to interpretation. But the
definition itself may need interpretation in which case the court can utilize
the tools of the Integrative Approach to clarify any definitions contained
in the policy. In addition to canons of word meaning, a court using the
Integrative Approach may apply canons of substantive law or policy.
Several canons specific to insurance are of particular importance. First,

123. Prior to the revisions resulting in the April 2018 RLLI, its section on insurance policy
interpretation was less textual and more expressly contextual.
124. Nor do we ban references to dictionaries. We simply prefer that they not be treated as
conclusive religious pronouncements that brook no dissent, particularly in view of the discretion courts
have in selecting particular dictionaries and listed meanings. Dictionaries are simply another form of
extrinsic evidence, perhaps even very good extrinsic evidence. But they are not a substitute for a broader
analysis of a disputed term in light of the transaction under review. Regarding judicial deployment of
dictionaries, see generally Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies
and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915 (2010); Kevin Werbach, Note,
Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994).
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insurance agreements should generally be broadly construed to affect the
risk management objective, unless there is convincing evidence to suggest
the parties intended a narrower goal and narrower reading of the
agreement. Second, exclusions in an insurance policy should be strictly
and narrowly construed. Third, the insurer asserting applicability of an
exclusion should bear the burden of proof to demonstrate the applicability
of the exclusion. Fourth, provisions of a policy that operate in an
exclusion, such as definitions and conditions tending to defeat the
coverage promised in the insuring agreement, should be treated like
exclusions. Such provisions are those which remove coverage from the
initial grant of coverage. Like all contract provisions, exclusions should
be subjected to the reasonable rules of contra proferentem.
Exclusions deserve this less hospitable reception (as compared to
insuring agreements), because they tend to defeat coverage and can
disturb eminently reasonable expectations of coverage (particularly when
the circumstances of the transaction make close study of policy text
unlikely). The insurer’s role as the drafter of unclear policy text, with riskspreading as its core business function, makes it fairer to impose the costs
of uncertainty upon the insurer rather than the policyholder in close cases.
This may seem to some like an unduly pro-policyholder rule. We note,
however, that insurers have an advantage in that they can avoid unwanted
liability through better drafting of policies and, as repeat players in
coverage litigation, return to the drafting table if initially chosen language
creates unwanted coverage obligations. Policyholders lack that recourse.
In addition, even an insurer with ambiguous policy language should
ordinarily have nothing to fear. If the insurer’s interpretation of the
unclear language accords with the extrinsic information and transaction
context, such as party understanding, underwriting, and risk management
purpose, the insurer should prevail despite sub-optimal drafting.
Ambiguous language should be construed against the insurer only as a
tiebreaker of last resort.
Regarding context and chronology, the court should be aware of what
the parties were trying to accomplish with the transaction. When
insurance is purchased, the purpose is obvious in one respect, that being
to obtain insurance. We are suggesting something a little deeper, however,
including a look at the risk management goals of the parties and the type
of insurance product, such as general liability, professional liability,
product recall insurance, and business interruption coverage, obtained
through prevailing risk management concerns and practices.
It may be the case, for example, that a subcontractor was required by
the owner or general contractor to have insurance in place as a condition
of obtaining the subcontract. In such a case, the specifications of a job
proposal may provide valuable information about what the insurance
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policy was designed to accomplish—information that will inform the
reading of policy text. Or, for example, if a policyholder purchases both
an auto and homeowners' policy to cover legal liability, and the loss
appears to lie somewhere in between the two policies’ grants of
coverage,125 the court should assume it likely that one or both policies
cover the loss and particularly focus on avoiding gaps in coverage for the
consumer who tried to buy every kind of liability insurance and somehow
got caught between the definitional cracks in the boards. Of course, there
may well be gaps in coverage, but such gaps need to be discerned with
reference to the entire risk-management scheme and not some artificial
isolation where a court is almost wilfully blind to how concomitant
insurance sources operate together. Courts thus need to be mindful of
insurer efforts to design the scope of a policy’s coverage for a particular
market niche. For example, an automobile liability policy is not designed
to cover the general liability risks of unsafe premises or defective
products.126
Reading the contract holistically reduces the risk of vocabulary
myopia, wherein a court may attach what seems to be the “right” meaning
to an isolated word in the policy where consideration of the policy
suggests a different meaning for the word at issue. For example, the
parties may dispute the meaning of a word such as “accident” standing
alone. However, other provisions of the policy may make it obvious that
liability stemming from the policyholder’s regular business activity can
be “accidents” even though the policyholder intentionally engaged in the
business activity.
The type of policy at issue will inform construction of policy terms.
Although this will often merely confirm the court’s initial reading of
policy text, it can provide greater certainty to the interpreting court as well
as a window on the impact the decision may have. For example, an
upscale steakhouse restaurant may purchase a general liability policy.
The restaurant serves alcohol. Is it covered for dram shop liability?
Commercial general liability (“CGL”) policies typically contain an
exclusion for claims arising under or related to the sale of alcohol.
However, because the policy was purchased by an upscale steakhouse
restaurant, such restaurants usually serve alcohol, which supports the
policyholder’s claim of an objectively reasonable expectation of
coverage. However, because general liability and liquor liability risks
have long been considered different and thus segmented in the insurance
125. As is the case in many liability cases involving concurrent causation. See generally Erik S.
Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV.
957 (2010); Peter Nash Swisher, Insurance Causation Issues: The Legacy of Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 2 NEV. L.J. 351 (2002).
126. TOM BAKER & KYLE LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY (3d ed. 2013) at 417.
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market as two different products, the court can be comfortable applying
the language of the liquor liability exclusion quite literally.
Unless there were representations made that would support waiver or
estoppel, longstanding custom and practice, as well as the insuring
environment, support application of the liquor liability exclusion that is
broadly but clearly written. Consequently, in this type of dispute, the
regime of narrow construction of exclusionary language is of no help to
the policyholder who bought general liability insurance and not liquor
liability insurance. The policyholder may, however, have a claim against
the agent or broker who failed to recommend liquor liability insurance.
The agent or broker may in turn have a claim against its errors and
omissions insurer.
The larger context of an insurance policy purchase includes the history
of the parties’ contracting relations, specifically whether the parties were
engaged in a one-time contract, recently started transacting business, or
were involved in a longer pattern of a relational contract or series of
relational contracts. This can include a course of dealing or course of
performance regarding application of similar contracts. For example, the
parties may have exhibited a longstanding pattern regarding treatment of
claims.
After having made this initial assessment of the meaning of disputed
policy language, the court then considers where any relevant usage in
trade is applicable as well as course of dealing and course of performance.
With such background understanding to contextualize policy terms, the
court may then consult what might be termed “internal” aids to
interpretation as necessary. Some may be imbedded in the contract,
statute, or insurance policy at issue. For example, the writing under
review may contain specifically defined terms.
Judicial consultation may then be necessary to interpret “external” aids,
such as technical manuals, industry materials, common statutory
definitions of terms, or other evidence of popular usage. If the contract in
question has a drafting history, which standardized insurance policies
usually include, this can also be consulted by the court.
If there is specific information about the parties’ specific intent
regarding a policy term, evidence of this intent may be considered by the
court. Examples are correspondence or other communications of the
parties reflecting specific understanding or intent.
In many cases, background or contextual information will be
essentially uncontested, without disputes regarding whether a letter is
genuine, a meeting was held, contents of an explanatory brochure mean
this or that, and so on. However, in some cases there may be genuine
disputes regarding the “who, what, when, where, and how” questions
surrounding a transaction. In addition to disputes regarding the facts
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surrounding entry into a contract or purchase of an insurance policy, there
may also be disputes regarding past practices of the parties, industry
custom, claims adjusting conduct, or the like.
In these situations, determining policy meaning via pretrial motion
would seem inapt. If documentary language is clear, and contrary
extrinsic information is refuted, suspect, or inadmissible, then a trial may
be unnecessary. However, in at least a significant subset of cases, a trial
or hearing may be required. This is not to suggest that contract
construction ceases being a matter of law in such cases. Rather, when
there are genuine factual disputes bearing on interpretation of the contract,
those facts must be resolved as a prerequisite to interpretation.
Even in the aggressive post-Twiqbal and Trilogy world,127 this will
likely require some modest increase in bench or jury trials. Textualists
and judicial imperialists will regard this as a drawback of the Integrative
Approach. We disagree. Greater use of the trial mechanism for factfinding is part of what the judicial system is supposed to deliver. The
settlement norms and tendencies of disputants are already wellestablished and unlikely to change even for disputes that survive motions
to dismiss and for summary judgment. Consequently, greater willingness
to consider and determine facts bearing on contract meaning will not
impose an unduly high price on the judicial system.
Further, when conducting cost-benefit analyses of trials, some
perspective is in order. Avoidance of a trial does not mean avoidance of
adjudication through other means, such as pre-trial motion. This type of
adjudication “on the papers” or in chambers (which usually includes oral
argument prior to decision) may seem streamlined as compared to trial,
but it is not free. It may consume more judicial resources issuing written
opinions on motions than would be expended on a hearing or trial
127. Although there may be legitimate debate about whether the development is wise or foolish
(we think the latter), there is really no dispute that the past 40 years have witnessed both a reduction in
trials and doctrine more receptive to pretrial disposition of matters by judges. See Stephen N. Subrin &
Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014); Arthur
R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60
DUKE L.J. 1 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003).
“Twiqbal” refers to the cases of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), which empowered judges to grant dismissal for failure to state a
claims via Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) if the trial judge found the claim sufficiently “implausible” based on
the judge’s “experience and common sense” (but without much deference to Seventh Amendment rights
to jury trial). See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV.
1851 (2008); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. J. L. & POL’Y 61 (2007).
The “Trilogy” refers to three important 1986 U.S. Supreme Court decisions that facilitated
increased use of summary judgment: Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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addressing fact questions bearing on contract meaning.128 Further, the
existence of fact questions may not require trial of an entire matter but
only a hearing to resolve disputed facts, provided this can be done
consistent with Seventh Amendment concerns or with party consent to a
bench trial of the issue.
Perhaps the primary external aid to construing contract and insurance
policy language is the other court decisions construing the same or similar
language. Courts consult other judicial opinions, particularly those with
precedential value in the jurisdiction as a matter of course regarding the
construction to be given terms. Such consultation may be for learning
from other courts’ readings of the text or for acquiring additional
knowledge that may be gleaned from the opinion concerning the type of
text, business, or activity under review. In similar fashion, courts may
consider treatises, law review articles, or other secondary sources that
may shed light on word meaning or the business or activity involved in
connection with the coverage claim.
If this array of tools is insufficiently conclusive or appears to lead to a
problematic result, the court can consider where apt the identity of the
document as something other than a contract. For insurance, this can be
particularly useful because of the multiple identities of insurance policies
as not only contracts but also products,129 private legislation,130 social
instruments or institutions,131 and outputs of a regulated industry.132
During this process, courts should consider whether any applicable
legislation bears on the interpretative process. For example, many states
have statutes setting forth ground rules and methodologies for statutory
construction.133 Although such statutes may have separation of powers
implications,134 they at least require consideration. Statutes
128. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Iliberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggregate
Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 LOYOLA L.J. 627 (2012) (also noting that roughly a third of
summary judgments appealed result in partial reversal or remand, undermining the efficiency claims of
summary judgment).
129. See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, supra note 53; Schwarcz, Products Liability,
supra note 53.
130. See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, supra note 53.
131. See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, supra note 53.
132. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2013),
sources cited in note 53, supra.
133. See Kevin Doty, My Hero Zero: The Forgotten NRS Chapter, NEV. LAWYER, Feb. 2007, at
28 (describing Nevada statute directing statutory construction); Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive
Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON. LEGIS. 211, 217 (1994) (surveying statutes setting forth ground
rules for construction).
134. To the extent a statute purports to direct the judicial process itself, it presents separation of
powers concerns. A legislative body is of course completely free (subject to constitutional constraints) to
enact the positive law it wishes and to define the terms used in a statute. But where the legislature sets
forth a methodology for statutory interpretation, one may legitimately wonder whether this constitutes an
excessive effort to administer the judiciary and control adjudicative outcomes. But legislation has
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choreographing contract construction appear considerably less common
but may raise even more serious separation of powers concerns.135
A court construing an insurance policy, or other contract or statute, may
at any time apply protocols of textual interpretation such as grammar rules
and canons of word meaning to the extent that these are apt in light of the
background and context of the disputed document under review.
However, if this is done at the outset of the interpretive process, it may
distort the process by saddling the court with unrealistic assumptions
regarding the actual drafting of the language under consideration.
Textual canons of construction can be helpful to the extent that they
shed light on the apt meaning of the word, but they can also be
contradictory and misleading, particularly if applied outside the contexts
that gave rise to the canons. Some canons seem simply wrong in terms
of modern speech patterns or customary communication prevailing in a
particular field.136 A court is likely to better appreciate the aptness of a
particular canon of construction for use in the case at hand if the court
first has an adequate understanding of the background, context, and
function of the contract or insurance policy at issue.
Canons of substantive law may be apt, provided they are correct
statements of substantive law or policy that do not contradict statutes,
caselaw, or aspects of the insurance policy or contract under review. Care
should be taken so that invocation of a substantive canon does not become
imposition of judicial personal preferences under the guise of legal
process neutrality. That said, neutral application of substantive policy
canons of contract construction should not be problematic.
For example, canons against enforcement of illegal or unconscionable
nonetheless long set forth norms such as liberal or strict construction of particular legislation and this has
not seemed to bother courts.
135. Where the legislature’s own products – statutes – are concerned, we think the legislature
logically has more leeway in setting forth not only what it means to achieve via a statute but also should
to a degree be able to indicate the scope of the statute and whether a liberal or strict construction is intended
or envisioned. But contract law has historically been the domain of common law that has shaped contract
doctrine. To be sure, legislatures can enact contract rules such as the Uniform Commercial Code. But
this is different than instructing courts as to how to go about common law decision-making.
136. For example, one textual canon posits that word in a contract or other document has its own
meaning and that writings should not be construed to be repetitive or redundant. See SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 5, at 174 (setting forth “Surplusage Canon” holding that “[i]f possible, every word and every
provision [of a statute or contract] is to be given effect. None should be ignored. None should needlessly
be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.”).
But this canon simply seems wrong, at least in many cases involving legal issues. One need not look far,
for example, to find a will in which the testator states that she will “give, bequeath and devise” (three
repetitive redundancies) or a discovery request for any documents “depicting, describing, addressing,
summarizing, discussing, or relating to” a topic. Redundancy is an occupational hazard of legal
documents, prompted by a drafter’s fear that expressing a concept in a single work may lead to
misunderstanding (so much for the benefits of a purely textual approach). As a result, drafters repeat
themselves. Consider, for example, the pollution exclusion found in a standard form CGL insurance
policy, which uses roughly twenty words to convey the concept of an unwanted substance or waste matter.
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terms appear justified, provided they are not broadly applied to nullify
agreements that are not blatantly unfair or likely to encourage
socioeconomic mischief. Greater use of some currently under-applied
substantive canons of contract construction seem apt. For example, one
substantive canon is that “law abhors a forfeiture,” something worth
remembering when addressing defenses to coverage that, if successful,
preclude indemnity for which years of premiums may have been paid.
Canons favoring broad construction of insuring agreements and narrow
construction of exclusionary language are in the same vein in that they
encourage different approaches to words based on their location in the
insurance policy and whether the words seek to establish or restrict
coverage.137 Another is the canon favoring construction in furtherance of
the public interest.138
After consideration of the foregoing factors, the entire list of which
would often be inapplicable to a particular dispute, the court has likely
determined the correct reading of the disputed term. To be more of a legal
realist about it, the judge has likely assigned the term a particular meaning
based on applying policy language as well as considering extrinsic
evidence and contextual factors. If the meaning of the disputed term
remains unclear, the contra proferentem principle is applied as a
tiebreaker of last resort to determine the meaning the court will assign.
Before turning the assigned meaning of a term into an adjudicative
ruling on contract meaning, the court needs to first consider whether the
contract as so construed would be void for illegality,139
unconscionability,140 or
inconsistency
with
public
policy
considerations.141 For example, a given jurisdiction may view punitive
damages as uninsurable under state public policy trumping typical
liability language, committing the insurer to pay damages without regard
to the categorization of the damages.142

137. See TAN 40, supra (discussing treatment of exclusionary provisions in insurance policies).
138. See Patterson, supra note 61, at 854 (“If a public interest is affected by a contract, that
interpretation or construction is preferred which favors the public interest.”).
139. See PERILLO, supra note 4, § 3.7(e), ch. 22 (illegal contracts, even if clear, are not
enforceable); FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 5.1 (same).
140. See PERILLO, supra note 4, § 3.7(e) (unconscionable contract terms, even if clear, are not
enforceable; unconscionability defined as combination of bargaining defect and pronounced substantive
unfairness); FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 4.28 (same). See, e.g., Gonski v. Dist. Ct., 245 P.3d 1164 (Nev.
2010) (adopting “sliding scale” approach to unconscionability in which varying amounts of “procedural”
and “substantive” unconscionability in combination may make contract provision unenforceable). See
also Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
485, 487 (1967) (coining terms “procedural” and “substantive” unconscionability).
141. See PERILLO, supra note 4, ch. 22, § 22.11 (contract terms that violate public policy will not
be enforced or may be modified to comply with public policy); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, Ch. 5.
142. MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 120, Ch. 20 (noting state divergence in treatment of
punitive damages).
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These backstops of contract construction constitute the standard
conception of judicial “policing” of insurance policies or other
contracts.143 This remains a valuable role for this sort of traditional
supervision by courts, particularly the use of the unconscionability
doctrine in consumer cases should an insurance policy provision be
oppressive in application. We also find no barrier to such judicial activity
on “freedom of contract” grounds. We term this type of judicial activity
“Type I Policing” of contracts in which the court declines to give full
enforcement to the interpretation that has been reached regarding
meaning of a contract. An example from insurance law is the refusal of
most courts to require a policyholder to undergo a medical procedure that
an insurer believes will reduce its coverage liability.144
In addition, there is another, softer variety of “Type II Policing” of
contracts in which courts construe provisions in a manner consistent with
at least one interpretation of the agreement, although not necessarily the
literal or most natural reading, in order to avoid disproportionate
forfeiture or other adverse impacts on either the parties or society.
Examples from insurance law include requiring the insurer to demonstrate
prejudice from late notice of a claim or loss by the policyholder 145 and
refusal to enforce an anti-assignment clause where assignment post-dates
the loss and did not increase the risk borne by the insurer.146
A more comprehensive and Integrative Approach to contract
construction can, in apt cases, operate as Type II policing of contracts by
the judiciary and correspondingly reduce the need for Type I policing
because of better judicial construction of disputed contract terms. The
improvement will only increase over time, as the body of jurisprudence
construing standard policy terms will grow and become self-referential in
a cohesive fashion that is currently not the case.
The comprehensive template of the Integrative Approach has a length
that makes it look daunting and burdensome. However, in the concrete
setting of a particular dispute, the list will almost always shrink based on
what is applicable to the particular case. More importantly, courts that
apply the proposed Integrative Approach can largely rely on counsel to
143. See Perillo, supra note 4, ch. 3 (discussing judicial unwillingness to enforce problematic text);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, chs. 4, 5 (discussing “policing the agreement” and “unenforceability on
grounds of public policy and unconscionability).
144. See, e.g., Heller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 833 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Illinois
law and refusing to require policyholder receiving disability benefits to undergo surgery for carpel tunnel
syndrome that insurer believed would permit physician policyholder to return to work).
145. This “notice-prejudice” rule is the norm in all but a few states, with most all notice-prejudice
states requiring the insurer to prove prejudice from late notice rather than requiring the insurer to prove
lack of prejudice. See MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 120, ch. 4.
146. See Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court, 354 P.3d 302 (Cal. 2015) (overruling Henkel Corp. v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2003)); Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 100 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1939) (applying Minnesota law).
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present, in digestible form, the information falling within the categories
of this list.
If counsel is not forthcoming with such information regarding
uncertain or difficult text in a contract document, the court faced with
such challenging language may request briefing that includes contextual
information or even schedule a “show cause” order demanding
information regarding industry standards, usage in trade, course of
dealing, or communications pertaining to the parties’ understanding of a
dispute term or expectations regarding a transaction.
Counsel who wants to prevail will bring this information to the court.
If they refrain, because this information undermines their textual
argument, opposing counsel is highly likely to place this information
before the court. Courts need to do “heavy lifting” to discern extra-textual
information only where sufficiently interested or if they deem it necessary
to avert grave injustice due to lack of competent counsel or severe
imbalance of resources.
C. Distinguishing the Integrative Approach From Alternative Methods
At this point, one might ask what is different about our proposed
Integrative Approach, as compared to the contextual approach of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts or the pre-January 2018 RLLI
approach, at least as we construe the former RLLI Approach as largely
following Pacific Gas & Electric v. Thomas Drayage. The short, but
perhaps humbling, answer is “not all that much.” We freely concede that
our proposed Integrated Approach to construing document text of
insurance policies, contracts generally, and statutes, as well as compacts,
treaties, and constitutions, has considerable kinship with both approaches.
Although such kinship may deem our proposal not particularly
innovative, it also means our proposal is not radical, untested, or
unworkable. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts was published 40
years ago. Although it did not obtain complete acceptance in the courts,
it has enjoyed substantial favor and is the expressed law of many
jurisdictions. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has been very
influential, even if unable to displace the hegemony of textualism. We
regard the Restatement’s approach to contract construction as
dramatically superior to a confined textual inquiry. Our goal is to
convince readers across the profession that a refined, updated, slightly
expanded version of the Restatement approach fused with the Thomas
Drayage receptiveness to extrinsic evidence deserves wider acceptance,
particularly regarding construction of insurance policies.
Thomas Drayage was decided 50 years ago and, although perhaps
constrained in its scope by subsequent California cases, establishes a
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receptive approach to textual interpretation that appears to have worked
well for a half-century. To state the obvious, California is the largest state
in the union not only in population but also economically and legally. It
has thrived during this period. Would this really happen if California’s
contract law was bad or even subpar? Either in the abstract or as compared
to textualism? We think not. Contract law is considered perhaps the most
important part of law regarding business operations. By comparison,
jurisdictions generally viewed as more textualist, such as New York, have
lost ground economically to California during this same period.
Frankly, any approach to construction is superior to “High-Church”
textualism that refuses to consider indicia of meaning other than policy
text or the text of other standardized contract forms. Although similar to
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Thomas Drayage, and pre-2018
RLLI § 3, the Integrative Approach differs from these other defensible
approaches and improves upon them in several respects.
First, under the Integrative Approach, before even beginning to assess
the text of the contract document or statute, the court surveys the
background history that brought the document into being. We have long
been puzzled at the legal orthodoxy of beginning to examine disputed
document language, with the language before first becoming at least a
little bit familiar with the events giving rise to the dispute—in particular,
the transaction that is subject of the document under review. To us, it is
like beginning to read and understand a book without some inkling of
whether it is a mystery, science textbook, travel journal, gardening
manual, or pornography. Consider how the words “hot,” “pot,” “fast,”
“cool,” and “jerk” all can have quite different meanings in these various
genres.
In the realm of contract and insurance disputes, it similarly makes sense
to know what business or consumer activity initiated a transaction as well
as something about the relationship of the parties and genesis of the
dispute before reading the disputed text. It is curiously bizarre in
insurance that courts regularly do not make a practice of familiarizing
themselves with the subject of the insurance policy in the commercial
marketplace. If the court were similarly construing terms in a cell phone
contract, for example, the words in that document would be informed by
that context, instead of the words appearing in a house mortgage
agreement. This is by no means extrinsic evidence. It is evidence of what
the “thing” is to be construed. How can one make an informed decision
about word meaning without at least knowing what kind of document “the
thing” happens to be?
Second, the Integrative Approach is arguably even less text-dependent
than the Restatement (Second) of Contracts or pre-2018 RLLI approaches
in that the party seeking to introduce extrinsic evidence in contradiction
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of the prevailing view of the meaning of the text is not required to set
forth an alternative meaning to which the contested text is susceptible. It
is sufficient for the party to argue that the challenged text is not properly
part of the agreement or is an inaccurate memorialization of the
agreement. What is generally but perhaps misleadingly referred to as
contract reformation147 is part of the Integrative Approach.
Modern contract law in most jurisdictions permits such challenges
pursuant to doctrines of mistake, fraud, or reformation.148 We would
prefer that this concept be incorporated into core contract construction
doctrine and used at the outset of the analysis. It becomes misleading
otherwise to go through the exercise of formulating a meaning of a term
devoid of its context to then back out of that meaning for some other,
unrelated reason. The text of a document may be completely in error or
in contradiction to the promises made and transaction entered into by the
parties. When this occurs, the party aggrieved should not need to offer a
plausible alternative reading of language that never should have been in
memorialization of the agreement at all. The aggrieved party should also
be able to make this argument without the need to satisfy the elements of
the mistake, reformation, or fraud escape hatches.
Similarly, the Integrative Approach rejects the minority view of the
parol evidence rule preventing extrinsic evidence regarding lack of full
integration of a contract document. Pursuant to the majority approach to
parol evidence, a contract document’s recitation that it is integrated, and
thus permits no consideration of evidence outside the four corners of the
document, may be challenged through introduction of evidence showing
that the recitation is inaccurate.149
Although one can make a good case for eliminating the parol evidence
rule entirely, as most European countries have done,150 the Integrative
Approach does not go to such lengths. It does, however, take a narrower
147. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs., U. of Ill. v. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 969 F.2d 4329 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying
Illinois law. The court “reforms” policy to make it clear that full policy limits apply to stub policy period
of less than a year but in essence is not reforming or changing the policy but merely revising language to
reflect the meaning always attached to the policy).
148. See PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 3.7, 9.25-9.40 (discussing doctrines of fraud, mistake, and
reformation); FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §§ 4.10, 7.5, 9.2-9.3 (same).
149. See PERILLO, supra note 4, Ch. 3 (discussing parol evidence rule and jurisdictional differences
regarding admissibility of evidence bearing on the question of whether document if fully integrated);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §§ 7.2-7.6 (same).
150. The pre-EU law of most European nations and the EU’s Principles of International
Commercial Contracts(“PICC”) as well as the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”)
lack the parol evidence rule and appear to have functioned well. See See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE
LAW, U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, Art. 6, U.N. Sales
No. E.10.V.14 (2010). See, e.g., MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino,
S.p.A. 144 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1998) (permitting buyer in case governed by CISG to introduce extrinsic
evidence disputing writing containing a limitation on remedies where contract stated it was fully
integrated).
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view of what constitutes parol evidence than do many courts. Often, parol
evidence and extrinsic evidence are treated as synonyms. This is akin to
decisions that speak of “jurisdiction” without regard to whether the term
means power to hear a matter (subject matter jurisdiction), power over a
party (personal jurisdiction), inability to extend a deadline (a
“jurisdictional” limitation), or the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in
administrative law.
We consider parol evidence to be solely evidence of pre-contract
negotiations offered to contradict clear terminology in a contract
document memorializing an agreement. Pursuant to the parol evidence
rule in the United States, such evidence may not be received. However,
extrinsic evidence about the background and setting of a transaction, the
nature of the businesses and business relations, industry custom and
practice, and surrounding circumstances, such as a war or natural disaster,
may properly be considered without violating the parol evidence rule.
The Integrative Approach also embraces a view of a reasonable
expectations analysis closer to the strong Keeton form than is otherwise
found in most cases.151 Recall that pursuant to the strongest form of
reasonable expectations analysis, a policyholder’s objectively reasonable
expectations may trump even clear policy language. The Integrative
Approach does not support automatic displacement or de facto revision
of policy text solely based on policyholder expectations, but it does permit
expectations to overcome text when such expectations are sufficiently
supported by additional factors, such as the evidence of policy purpose
and function at odds with the language of the policy.
We realize this suggestion is guaranteed to raise the hackles of insurers,
who can be expected to argue that the policy language reflects policy
intent and purpose. If they are correct, they will prevail. However, where
insurers sell policies that are inapt to serve the intended market function
for the policyholder, the insurer should not be able to escape coverage
based on a literalist application of language that usually was not even
provided to the policyholder until after purchase of the insurance, and for
that matter, was probably never even read by the policyholder.
Unfortunately, the adage that the “large print giveth” while the “small
print taketh away” has reflected too much of the practice of modern
contracting, including insurance contracting. This approach should be
eradicated and replaced by a rule of interpretation that requires contract
designers, and those documenting contracts, to sell products consistent
with the purchaser’s purpose or take sufficient steps to prevent
policyholders from forming reasonable conceptions of coverage
inconsistent with the policy form.

151. See TAN 41 addressing the reasonable expectation approach and its variants.
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The same holds true for contract documents in other contexts. This
may require an expansion of some insurance products or other
contractually-based services, under which insurers and other vendors are
entitled to charge correspondingly higher premiums and prices.
Alternatively, insurers and other vendors must take steps to prevent
purchasers from getting the “wrong” view from the insurer/vendor
perspective but nonetheless the “reasonable” view. This is not as difficult
as it seems.
Recall that a policyholder’s subjective or idiosyncratic view of
coverage is entitled to essentially no weight, the exception being
situations where the subjective or idiosyncratic view represents a specific
contracting intent of the parties. Consequently, all an insurer must do is
something sufficiently informative to prevent the mythical “reasonable”
policyholder from believing there is coverage for categories of loss or
claim the insurer does not wish to cover. Rather than “hiding” limitations
on coverage in a lengthy list of exclusions, conditions, or definitions, the
insurer probably need only use a summary brochure to which the
purchaser’s attention is directed, perhaps with some commentary of the
sales agent walking the purchaser through the checklist of the policy’s
scope and limitations. Specifically, for internet purchases of insurance,
this could be done by requiring the purchaser to check off a disclaimer list
item by item.
This sort of practice has remarkable potential to broaden the insurer’s
tools in marketing and selling policies. It may also drastically reduce
litigation costs, as the insurer would not be limited to one “true” source
of meaning: the policy. Thus far, insurers are often reluctant to provide
such information to policyholders for fear of conflicting a favorable
reading of policy terms. However, if such documents regularly become
part of the Interpretive Approach, insurers may well be more ready to
invest in such documents, thus decreasing litigation overall because terms
will cease to be legalistic anachronisms, and policyholders will be more
informed regarding their coverage rights.
This type of activity would go a long way toward prompting greater
flow of coverage information to policyholders at a more relevant time
than post-loss.152 If a policyholder has greater information about coverage
when that information is relevant to the policyholder, there is a far greater
potential for the policyholder to control her behavior with an eye to
avoiding insurance moral hazard concerns. Frankly, courts too need to
know about coverage information when promulgating judicial rules about
insurance policy interpretation.153
152. Daniel Schwarcz, Coverage Information in Insurance Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1457, 1507
(2017).
153. Id.
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Perhaps the most significant difference between the proposed
Integrative Approach and its Restatement (Second) of Contracts and pre2018 RLLI § 3 allies is that the Integrative Approach not only permits
consideration of a broad range of contextual factors and information at
variance with the preferred meaning of text but also permits assessment
of document text through prisms other than contract.
Regarding insurance policies, courts using the Integrative Approach
may consider alternative characterizations of insurance policies as
products, private legislation, social instruments, or a regulated industry.154
This is not to suggest that insurance policies do not remain contracts for
purposes of legal analysis but is a means of providing additional context
and understanding about the contractual arrangement under review.
For example, recognizing that insurance policies, particularly standard
form policies and especially those purchased by consumers, often operate
more like a purchased product rather than a negotiated deal, can assist the
court in better determining the purpose and function of the policy and
intent of the “contracting” parties. This understanding is likely to lead to
improved interpretation of policy language. Knowing something about
the insurance “product” under review can also assist the court in
determining what objectively reasonable expectations might be held by
policyholders, insurers, and others relying on the policy. This in turn can,
at a minimum, inform the interpretation of policy language and be used if
the court is inclined to apply a strong Keeton-esque version of the
reasonable expectations approach.
Likewise, the wide use of ISO insurance policy forms promulgated for
the property or casualty industry has aspects of private legislation,
industry standards akin to construction safety protocols or Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and other professional trade or
guild standards. Appreciating these observations provide additional
contextual background for assessing the meaning of policy text. Like the
product analogy, the insurance-policy-as-statute approach can also
illuminate party expectations and understandings of the operation and
purpose of the insurance in question.
Similarly, viewing insurance policies in their role as social instruments
or socioeconomic institutions assists interpretation by noting the function
of the insurance policy in question. Presumptively, policy text should be
consistent with the ordinary functioning of the insurance under review in
the larger scheme of risk management.155 Knowing something about that
154. See notes 53, 60, 129-32, supra, citing publications arguing for consideration of insurance
policies as products, private legislation, social institutions, social instruments, and the activity of a
regulated industry.
155. We say “presumptively” because the parties are of course free to depart from conventional
understanding through customized provisions of the policy. For example, an insurer may specifically
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larger scheme of things and ordinary function of the insurance assists a
court in construing policy language.
The view of insurance as a regulated industry akin to a utility can also
be illuminating in that it, like the other characterizations discussed above,
can increase a court’s contextual understanding of the insurance in
question and its relation to the activity of the disputing parties. For
example, some kinds of insurance, such as auto insurance, may be
mandatory to purchase to perform a certain act, such as driving a motor
vehicle. Most financial institutions that are regulated industries require
the purchase of insurance before issuing a home mortgage. Accounting
for these regulated responses may counsel in favor of invalidating a policy
provision inconsistent with the regulatory scheme or mandating coverage
consistent with regulatory minimums or objectives. It may also negate
proffered public policy arguments in favor of coverage where prevailing
regulation does not align with or support the suggested public policy.
Further, it may even provide a safe harbor on the ground that a policy
form approved by regulators cannot be illegal, facially unconscionable,
or in violation of state public policy.
Although our thinking in this area is most developed regarding
insurance, we believe that many types of contracts are susceptible to what
might be termed “heuristic re-characterization” which views the
instrument or transaction under review not only as a contract but also
appreciates alternative conceptions of the transaction. Almost all widelyused standardized contracts, particularly those marketed to consumers,
can be seen as products as well as contracts, such as a lease, provider
agreement, repair or service agreement, and club membership.
Like the contextual and California approaches, the Integrative
Approach is receptive to specific information about party intent, such as
pre-dispute correspondence regarding the meaning of policy text.
Likewise, the Integrative Approach is receptive to information regarding
usage in trade, course of dealing, course of performance, the relational
nature of a contract, and party history and conventions. The Integrative
Approach is also receptive to the extra-textual tools routinely used by
even the most textual courts, such as dictionaries (though with caution
about their inherent limitations, as noted in Part IV), canons of word
meaning, treatises, precedent, drafting history, and other industry
materials. This includes not only other court decisions construing the
same or similar language but also precedent that does not address the
same language but otherwise illuminates the interpretative issues before
exclude a risk ordinarily covered under a general liability policy because of the particular policyholder’s
exposure to such risk (or, alternatively, use a sublimit or special endorsement regarding the risk or charge
additional premium). Such deviations from the normal scope of coverage should be sufficiently
consensual and clear before a court deprives a policyholder of ordinarily expected coverage.
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the court. For example, there may be an opinion providing background
on the development of a type of insurance policy, discussing industry
custom and practice, or examining the type of business or personal
activity involved in the dispute.
VII. THE FEASIBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY OF THE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH
The Integrative Approach has a distinct advantage to prior approaches,
especially a textual purist approach: the Integrative Approach does not
have to be applied in baroque fashion in every case. In fact, it may well
be reserved for only the “hard cases,” where actual meaning of a term is
a palpable issue. In many, perhaps even most cases, a simple peek at the
policy language leads a court to the inevitably reasonable conclusion of
whether there is coverage. Therefore, there would be no need to resort to
an Integrative Approach which prompts a court to consider purpose in a
detailed fashion.
For example, if a policyholder is arguing that she should have general
liability coverage when she is sued for prematurely terminating a contract,
a court can quickly rule that there is no coverage and probably no potential
for coverage, because there would be no “physical injury to tangible
property”. This sort of finding is one that can be derived from the
language of the policy alone or the language assessed with a “quick look”
at the context, circumstances, custom, and practice. Both methods would
arrive at the same just result.
The Integrative Approach thus does not require a “deep dive” into nontextual or extra-textual factors in the ordinary case and will therefore not
add much adjudicative burden. Its application can exist on a continuum.
For the close case, where the meaning of a term is at issue, the Integrative
Approach will of course require more heavy lifting by counsel and courts,
although these cases always take longer under a textual approach as well.
This, however, is justified by the need to achieve more just results and
confident rulings in tricky cases.
The Integrative Approach also holds potential for implications beyond
insurance policy construction alone. Armed with the Integrative
Approach, a court is in a far better position to make important
determinations about insurer and policyholder conduct. We can foresee
the advantage of the Integrative Approach in court inquiries into
policyholder misrepresentation or fraud, and even into insurer bad faith.
An inquiry into whether the insurer has acted unreasonably or failed to
give equal consideration to the interests of the policyholder can be more
appropriately conducted by a court taking an Integrative Approach,
because that court is then able to uncover unreasonable assertions of noncoverage by the insurer, such as a flat-out refusal to defend in the face of
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clear coverage—to name a particularly egregious example. Thus, courts
may be less willing to grant summary judgment to an insurer on grounds
that a claim was “fairly debatable” because the Integrative Approach may
well show that such is not the case.
In addition to being flexible enough to operate on a continuum as
needed, the Integrative Approach provides a better solution for producing
more just interpretive results than those approaches that, as a major
component in the interpretive exercise, purport to rely on disambiguated
consumer survey evidence of a target population’s lay understanding of a
policy term. Indeed, we think that type of evidence ranges from unhelpful
at best to misleading at worst, because it is simply an extreme form of
hyper-textualism in different clothing.
An example may be instructive as to how seamlessly the Integrative
Approach would operate with a recent case. The recent COVID-19
pandemic has produced an explosion of insurance coverage litigation,
particularly in the realm of business interruption coverage for pandemicrelated losses.156 Many businesses in America suffered significant
financial losses because of government lockdowns aimed at curbing the
spread of the COVID-19 virus. A high proportion of those businesses
were insured by standard all-risks commercial property policies, many of
which had additional coverage for business interruption losses. The
business interruption coverage insured the business’ income stream in the
event the business suffered a covered loss under the property policy. The
coverage clause in the standard all-risks commercial property policy
provides coverage for “direct physical loss of or damage to property.”157
So, to claim for business interruption losses, a business would have to
prove it suffered a covered “direct physical loss of or damage to
property.”
Imagine a nail salon was deemed a non-essential business and forced
to close for three weeks due to a government-ordered shutdown during
the COVID-19 pandemic. Did the nail salon suffer a “direct physical loss
of or damage to property” such that it could claim business interruption
losses from its insurance policy? The coverage clause is not defined in the
policy, nor are any of the individual terms in the clause.
The Integrative Approach would prompt a broad construction of the
clause with an eye to the policy’s risk management objectives. Here, allrisks commercial property insurance is sold to protect the property
interests of commercial policyholders. If something happens to their
property, policyholders expect to be able to turn to their property
insurance. The business interruption portion of that insurance would

156. See, e.g., Knutsen & Stempel, Infected Judgment, supra note 3.
157. See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, ON INSURANCE COVERAGE, supra note 41, § 15.01[D].
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insure the income stream connected with that property. If something
happens to the property such that that loss is covered, the interrupted
income stream resulting from that loss should be replaced by the
insurance.
By reading the policy, and keeping that context in mind, one would
then turn to what “direct physical loss of or damage to property” means
in the context of business interruption insurance as contained in all-risks
commercial property insurance. Because the clause is a coverage clause,
it should be construed broadly. While the property likely did not suffer
“damage” as is ordinarily understood, did the policyholder suffer a “direct
physical loss” because of the COVID-19-related order shutting down the
business? “Loss” is mentioned separately from “damage.” The
policyholder effectively had a “physical loss” during closure—it could
not open, no one could work, and no customers could come to the store.
It lost the use of the store. The clause does not appear to require any
physical alteration to property, as the clause does not say so, and reading
that limitation in would run contrary to reading a coverage clause broadly.
If one turned to caselaw examining this coverage clause, there are
many instances of courts granting coverage for loss of use of property
when the premises in question is contaminated by some ephemeral things
like smoke,158 mold,159 carbon monoxide,160 radiation,161 or gas.162 One
could certainly make an analogy that a dangerous virus operates like those
contaminants. However, some cases hold that the clause requires there to
be actual physical alteration of the property for coverage to attach.163 As
noted above, the clause does not demand that as a requirement for
coverage.
If courts are construing this clause in different ways, requiring different
expectations for coverage to attach, and not agreeing that loss of use
equates to a covered “loss,” then this is strong evidence that the clause is
ambiguous. It is subject to two or more reasonable meanings, although
we may quibble that the reading which reads in a requirement for tangible
physical alteration may be on the fringes of reasonable. In that case, if a
term is ambiguous, it is to be construed contra proferentem, as against the
158. Oregon Shakespeare Festival Ass’n v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3267247 (D. Or. June 7,
2016).
159. Sullivan v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 956 A.2d 643 (Del. 2008); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Lillard-Roberts, No. CV-01-1362-ST, 2002 WL 31495830, at *8-*9 (D. Or. June 18, 2002) (applying
Oregon law).
160. Matzner v. Seaco Ins. Co., 1998 WL 566658 (Mass. Super. Aug. 12, 1998).
161. Am. All. Ins. Co. v. Keleket X-Ray Corp., 248 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 1957).
162. TRAVCO Ins. Co. v. Ward, 715 F.Supp.216 699 (E.D. Va. 2010).
163. See, e.g., Source Food Technology, Inc. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 465 F.3d
834 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying Minnesota law); Mama Jo’s, Inc. v. Sparta Ins. Co., 823 F. App’x 868, 870
(11th Cir.) (applying Florida law).
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drafter. Therefore, insurance coverage would attach in this scenario.
The Integrative Approach leads to this coverage result without the use
of dictionaries. But, if one takes a purely textualist approach alone, one
must struggle with the words “direct,” “physical,” “loss,” and “damage,”
without reference to what each means and for what purpose. The result is
likely a reductionist conclusion that “physical” means “something you
can touch,” “loss” means “to lose something,” and “damage” means that
“something came to harm.” That parse-out of the words approach still
leaves one wondering what the phrase together means. To get to the
phrase requiring actual tangible alteration to property for coverage to
attach, one must emphasize the word “physical” above the other words.
And one must ignore the legion of cases where invisible contamination
resulted in insurance coverage being triggered for very similar kinds of
losses.
The accuracy of a purely textual approach may be improved through
use of text-based inquiry that is not limited to dictionaries such as corpus
linguistics, a process in which a large data base is scanned to examine the
way words are used in a variety of writings. Although this approach to
discerning meaning holds promise and will often constitute an
improvement over dictionary use alone, like any excessively textualist
approach, it may be insufficient to resolve an interpretative dispute and
even have potential to mislead. Corpus linguistics holds substantial
promise for improving interpretation of insurance policies and other
documents, but in our view should not be the sole or perhaps not even the
primary determinant of documentary meaning.164
The Integrative Approach arrives at a contextual, considered response
to coverage that is closer to the commercial expectations of this all-risks
commercial property policy, both from the perspective of the insurer and
the policyholder. To the policyholder who cannot use its nail salon due to
the government order banning occupancy, it has physically lost that

164. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Adding Context and Constraint to Corpus Linguistics, 86 BROOK. L.
REV. 389 (2021). For description, analysis, support and criticism of corpus linguistics, see Mouritsen,
supra note 124 (criticizing isolated dictionary use and urging greater use of corpus linguistics for textual
interpretation); Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Corpus and the Critics, 88 U. CHI. L. REV.
275 (2021) (arguing that although corpus linguistics focuses on textual meaning, the process inherently
involves context as reflected in use of terms contained in wide range of writings and accepting that corpus
linguistics analysis is not sole determinant of word meaning); Kevin Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning,
134 HARV. L. REV. 726 (2020); Lawrence Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal
Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311 (2017) (summarizing and critiquing corpus linguistics). Several
databases have been assembled containing millions or even billions of entries from newspaper, books,
periodicals, broadcast transcripts and the like. See e.g., Corpus of Historical American English, ENGLISHCORPORA, https://www.english-corpora.org/coha/ [https://perma.cc/2CAU-U9N5]; Corpus of
Contemporary American English, ENGLISH-CORPORA, https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/
[https://perma.cc/99B2-4X4Z]. See generally Symposium, Data-Driven Interpretation, 86 BROOK. L.
REV. (2021) (forthcoming); Symposium, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1297 (2017).
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property. It cannot earn income. Coverage should be triggered. Its
property interest in the property has effectively been harmed by a cause
that is not excluded under the policy. To the insurer, it underwrote allrisks property insurance that had a business interruption component to it.
If something happened to result in interference with the policyholder’s
property rights to such a degree that it could not operate its business, the
policy should be triggered.
CONCLUSION
In contrast to rigid and restrictive textualism, a more Integrative
Approach that sets a place at the table for an array of extrinsic and
contextual evidence is likely to provide more accurate and just
adjudication consistent with the intended meaning, purpose, and function
of both statutes and contracts, particularly insurance policies. States
construing insurance policies would get closer to justice by rejecting word
worship and embracing the predecessor provision of the RLLI, the
Restatement (Second) of Contract’s true interpretive spirit, the Thomas
Drayage line of California cases, the reasonable expectations principle,
and a contextual approach to determining the meaning of contracts, all of
which are underpinnings to the Integrative Approach.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/5

62

